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STAKING THE BOUNDARIES OF SOFTWARE COPYRIGHTS IN 
THE SHADOW OF PATENTS
Pamela Samuelson*
Abstract
Ever since the venerable Supreme Court opinion in Baker v. Selden,
courts and commentators have overwhelmingly endorsed the rule that 
copyright and utility patent protections for intellectual creations are 
mutually exclusive. That is, an intellectual creation may be eligible for 
copyright or utility patent protection, but not both. Original works of 
authorship are channeled to the copyright regime, while novel and 
nonobvious technologies are channeled to the patent system.
The well-established mutual exclusivity rule for copyright and utility 
patents was recently renounced, as applied to computer program 
innovations, by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc. One of Google’s defenses against 
Oracle’s charge of copyright infringement for its reuse of parts of the Java
application program interface (API) was that the API’s functionality
made it more properly patent, than copyright, subject matter. The CAFC 
rejected the exclusivity argument and endorsed overlapping 
copyright/patent protection for APIs.
Oracle is the latest exemplar of the vexing conceptual difficulties that 
computer programs have posed for both copyright and patent laws over 
the past fifty-some years. This Article provides an overview of the mutual 
exclusivity rule that grew out of Baker. It also explains why the CAFC’s 
Oracle decision is deeply flawed, and why courts should renew their 
commitment to the mutual exclusivity rule in software copyright cases to 
ensure that, consistent with long-standing limiting principles of copyright 
law and Supreme Court precedents, copyright will not be construed to 
give patent-like protection to program functionality.
This Article also offers concrete suggestions about how courts should 
approach discerning the proper boundaries of copyright and patent in 
protecting particular aspects of software. More clarity to the software 
copyright caselaw can be attained if courts engage in rigorous filtration 
of unprotectable nonliteral elements of software. When courts interpret 
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software copyright in the shadow of patents, they are less likely to exceed 
the boundaries articulated by Baker and § 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 
1976.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the venerable U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Baker v. 
Selden,1 courts and commentators have overwhelmingly endorsed the 
rule that copyright and utility patent protections for intellectual creations 
are mutually exclusive.2 That is, an intellectual creation may be eligible 
for copyright or utility patent protection, but not for both.3 Original works 
of authorship have been channeled to the copyright regime, while novel 
and nonobvious technologies have been channeled to the patent system.4
The well-established mutual exclusivity rule for copyright and utility 
patents was recently renounced, as applied to computer program 
innovations, by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.5 Oracle charged Google with 
infringing copyright by its use of 37 of the 166 Java application program 
interface (API) packages in its Android platform for smartphones.6 One 
of Google’s defenses against Oracle’s charge of copyright infringement 
was that the functionality of the Java API made it more properly patent, 
                                                                                                                     
1. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
2. For the leading cases, see infra Section I.B. The overwhelming majority of scholars 
concur that copyright and patent are and should be mutually exclusive forms of intellectual 
property (IP) protections. See Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of 
Copyright and Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1496 n.13 (2017) (citing 
authorities).
3. This exclusivity traces back further to the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress 
to enact legislation “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing copyright protection for “original works of 
authorship”); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing patent protection for novel, nonobvious, and 
useful machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and processes). This Article uses the 
word “patent” to refer to utility patents. When a context calls for reference to design patents, this
Article will use that term.
5. 750 F.3d 1339, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015).
6. Id. at 1350–51.
3
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rather than copyright, subject matter.7 Google pointed to patents that 
Oracle and Sun had obtained on API designs in support of this view.8
Although the trial court agreed that these patents supported Google’s 
defense,9 the CAFC rejected the exclusivity argument and endorsed 
overlapping copyright and patent protection for APIs.10
This Article explains why the CAFC’s endorsement of such 
overlapping protection is deeply flawed and why courts should renew 
their commitment to the mutual exclusivity rule in software copyright 
cases to ensure that, consistent with long-standing limiting principles of 
copyright law and Supreme Court precedents, copyright will not be 
construed to give patent-like protection to program functionality. As 
Google has once more petitioned the Supreme Court to review this case,11
there may be an opportunity for the Court to correct the CAFC’s 
erroneous rulings.12
                                                                                                                     
7. See, e.g., Google’s April 22, 2012 Copyright Liability Trial Brief at 1–3, Oracle Am., 
Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:10-cv-03651 WHA).
8. See, e.g., Google’s 4/3/12 Copyright Liability Trial Brief at 18–19, Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 
2d 974 (No. 3:10-cv-03651 WHA). Google’s main defenses were that the Java API elements it 
used were unprotectable systems under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) or under the merger doctrine. See, e.g.,
Google’s 4/5/12 Copyright Liability Trial Brief at 1, 8, Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (No. 3:10-
cv-03651 WHA). I discussed these defenses at length in Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and 
Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1237–84 (2016).
9. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 996–98 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d,
750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
10. See infra Section III.B for an analysis of the CAFC’s opinion on the copyright/patent 
overlap issue. After reversing the district court ruling that the parts of the Java API that Google 
used were unprotectable by copyright law, Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1354–71, the CAFC remanded the 
case for a retrial on Google’s fair use defense, id. at 1377. A jury in 2016 found this defense 
persuasive. The CAFC, however, decided that no reasonable jury could have found fair use and 
ruled in favor of Oracle’s appeal of the denial of its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The CAFC denied 
Google’s petition for rehearing, and Google has petitioned the Supreme Court to review the 
CAFC’s decisions as to both copyrightability and fair use. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google 
LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 18-956 (Jan. 24, 2019). 
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10; see also Alison Frankel, Google Wants 




12. The CAFC’s copyrightability ruling has been subjected to considerable criticism, see 
infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text, as has its reversal of the fair use verdict. See, e.g.,
Krista L. Cox, Oracle v. Google Is More Evidence that the Federal Circuit Has No Business 
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Oracle is the latest exemplar of the vexing conceptual difficulties that 
computer programs have posed for both copyright and patent laws over 
the past fifty-some years. The main reason for these difficulties is that 
programs are virtual machines that just happen to have been constructed 
as texts in the context of intellectual property (IP) regimes that have 
historically assumed that a particular creation was either a writing or a 
machine, but could not be both at the same time.13 This hybrid nature of 
programs has given rise to confusion and sometimes heated debate about 
the appropriate roles that copyright and patent law do and should play in 
the protection of software innovations.14 While there is general consensus 
that computer program code is copyrightable but not patentable,15
nonliteral elements of programs have seemed to some to be copyrightable 
and to others to be patentable.16 Most commentators have agreed that 
copyright and patent are and should be mutually exclusive in the 
                                                                                                                     
13. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320–24 (1994).
14. Most of the very extensive law review literature on IP rights in computer programs from 
the 1980s and early 1990s focused either on copyright or patent protection and did not attempt to 
articulate what aspects of software should be protected by each of these laws. For a representative 
copyright commentary, see generally Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: 
Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1493 (1987); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since 
CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993); J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied 
Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University 
Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1149 (1998). For a particularly useful compendium of pre-1998 software 
copyright caselaw, see generally DAVID L. HAYES, FENWICK & WEST LLP, A COMPREHENSIVE 
CURRENT ANALYSIS OF SOFTWARE “LOOK AND FEEL” PROTECTION (1998), 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Look_-_Feel.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF3K-KFLX].
For a representative patent commentary, see, for example, Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability 
of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 1019–20 (1986). Some commentators offered their 
perspectives on both copyright and patent protections for software. See, e.g., Duncan M. 
Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1037, 1054–63 (1986); 
Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection—Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret Law, 69 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 151, 165 (1987); John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: 
An Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145, 212 
(1991).
15. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT-
COPYRIGHT LAWS OVERLAP STUDY 11 (1991) [hereinafter OVERLAP STUDY].
16. See, e.g., Morton David Goldberg & John F. Burleigh, Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs: Is the Sky Falling?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 294, 298 (1989) (endorsing copyright 
protection for program structure); Steven W. Lundberg et al., Baker v. Selden, Computer 
Programs, 17 U.S.C. Section 102(b) and Whelan Revisited, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 221, 250 (1990) 
(suggesting that program structure is patentable).
5
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protection they provide to different aspects of programs;17 yet, a few 
commentators have endorsed overlapping copyright and patent 
protections for specific aspects.18
Part I of this Article begins with a review of the mutual exclusivity 
rule that grew out of Baker and explains that the functionality and written 
character of programs initially caused some confusion about whether 
copyright or patent was an appropriate form of IP protection for 
programs. After Congress decided copyright was appropriate, a few 
courts in the mid-to-late 1980s decided that copyright protection could 
extend to the “structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO) of programs. 
These decisions were widely criticized for giving patent-like protection 
to programs and raising the spectre of overprotection of software by 
copyright that would have deleterious effects on competition and 
innovation in the software industry. Members of Congress were
sufficiently concerned about overbroad protections that they held 
hearings and commissioned studies to address the perceived 
copyright/patent overlap problem.
                                                                                                                     
17. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Symbols, Systems, and Software as Intellectual 
Property: Time for CONTU, Part II?, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2018); 
Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1119, 1130 
(1986); Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV.
439, 448 (2003); Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection 
of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 41, 50–51 (1998) [hereinafter 
Karjala, Relative Roles]; Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 25–27 (1995); David G. Luettgen, Functional Usefulness vs. Communicative 
Usefulness: Thin Copyright Protection for the Nonliteral Elements of Computer Programs, 4 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233, 273 (1996); Steven W. Lundberg et al., The Copyright/Patent Interface: 
Why the Utilitarian “Look and Feel” Is Uncopyrightable Subject Matter, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 5, 5
(1989). The copyright/utility patent mutual exclusivity rule was questioned in the Nimmer treatise 
from its first edition in 1963 through the 2017 revision. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 38 (1963); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2A.07[A] (2017) [hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER 2017]. This treatise has recently been revised 
and now offers a more nuanced view on the mutual exclusivity rule. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07[A][3] (2018) [hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER 
2018]. It acknowledges this revision was prompted in part by Samuelson, Samuelson, supra note 
2, at 1505–12, which criticized the Nimmer treatise’s copyright/patent overlap theory. See 
NIMMER & NIMMER 2018, supra, § 2A.07[A][4].
18. See, e.g., David A. Einhorn, Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Software: 
Are They Mutually Exclusive?, 30 IDEA 265, 266 (1990). In the mid to late 1980s, IP lawyers were 
split on the software IP exclusivity or overlap issue. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Survey on the 
Patent/Copyright Interface for Computer Programs, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 256, 260–66 (1989). In 1989, 
a group of IP professors was unable to reach consensus about mutual exclusivity of copyright and 
patent in protecting computer program innovations. See Donald S. Chisum et al., LaST Frontier 
Conference Report on Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 28
(1989).
6
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Part II shows that concerns about copyright and patent overlaps 
subsided in the 1990s as numerous appellate court decisions recognized 
that the essentially utilitarian nature of programs meant that they should 
receive a relatively thin scope of copyright protection. These courts often 
acknowledged that the availability of patent protection for software 
innovations had some bearing on the proper scope of copyright protection
for programs. Courts adapted various limiting doctrines of copyright law 
to prevent copyright/patent overlap in software IP cases and left it to 
patent law to protect programs’ utilitarian elements. By interpreting the 
scope of copyright in the shadow of patents and filtering out functional 
design elements, courts in software copyright cases restored the balance 
that Congress intended when it excluded methods and processes from the 
protections afforded by copyright law.
Part III shows that the CAFC’s Oracle decision is the sole unreversed 
judicial opinion to have endorsed software copyright/patent overlaps. To 
support its view that copyright and patent could provide overlapping 
protections for software APIs, the CAFC inappropriately invoked dicta 
from the Supreme Court’s Mazer v. Stein19 decision, failing to notice that 
the Court in Mazer explicitly recognized that utility patents and 
copyrights are “mutually exclusive.”20 Part III also urges courts to be 
more receptive to arguments that the existence of issued patents for 
software innovations is evidence that those innovations should not be 
protectable by copyright law, even if such patents are not conclusive 
evidence that the innovations are uncopyrightable.
Part IV discusses Oracle’s destabilization of the copyright/patent 
balance in software cases and offers concrete suggestions about how 
courts should approach discerning the proper boundaries of copyright and 
patent in protecting particular aspects of software. It argues that courts 
should be warier than they have been to date of claims of copyright in 
program SSO because the SSO term obscures the distinction between 
copyrightable expression in programs and patentable methods of 
operation that Congress intended to exclude from copyright’s protection. 
More clarity in the software copyright caselaw can be attained if courts 
engage in rigorous filtration of unprotectable nonliteral elements of 
software and use computer-science-relevant terminology to describe 
these elements. Finally, Part V concludes.
                                                                                                                     
19. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
20. Id. at 215 n.33.
7
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I. SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR UPHOLDING THE MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY 
OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENT FOR COMPUTER PROGRAM INNOVATIONS
The conception of copyright and patent as mutually exclusive forms 
of IP rights derives from the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Baker v. 
Selden.21 Selden claimed copyright not only in the books he had written, 
but also in the bookkeeping system set forth in his books and embodied 
in forms he devised to instantiate the system.22 Because the preface to 
Selden’s book mentioned that he had sought a patent for this system, 
Baker argued that Selden regarded the system as patent, not copyright, 
subject matter.23 The Court agreed, holding that Selden’s copyright could 
protect his explanation of the system but did not extend to the system or 
the forms that instantiated that system.24 To obtain exclusive rights in 
useful arts, such as a bookkeeping system, the Court said, the creator must 
satisfy the more rigorous qualitative standards (that is, novelty and 
nonobviousness, not merely originality) and examination process 
required by the patent system.25 The Court sharply distinguished the 
writings of authors, which copyright protects, from inventions in the 
useful arts, which can be protected, if at all, only through the patent 
system (and then for a much shorter duration after a more rigorous review 
than copyright requires).26
Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co.27 confirmed the mutual 
exclusivity conception of copyright and patent. In Taylor, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected claims of copyright in 
temperature recording charts because although charts were statutorily 
eligible for copyright protection, these particular charts were essential 
parts of machines and the subject matter of expired utility patents.28 The 
                                                                                                                     
21. 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). 
22. Id. at 100. Baker is fundamentally a case about the distinction between the subject 
matters of copyright (writings of authors) and patent (inventions in the useful arts), not about the 
abstract idea/expression distinction. See Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden:
Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STORIES 159, 186–87 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
23. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 174–75.
24. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104–05.
25. Id. at 102–04.
26. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1496–1503, 1512–16 (discussing constitutional, statutory, 
caselaw, and policy reasons why copyright and patent rights do not and should not overlap in the 
same intellectual creations).
27. 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1943); see also Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 
910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (following Taylor in upholding the Copyright Office’s refusal to 
register claims of copyright in temperature recording charts).
28. Taylor, 139 F.2d at 99–101. When patents expire, the intellectual creation is dedicated 
to the public domain. See id. at 100–01.
8
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court conceived of copyright and patent subject matters as mutually 
exclusive:
While it may be difficult to determine in which field 
protection must be sought, it is plain . . . that it must be in 
one [copyright] or the other [patent]; it cannot be found in 
both. In other words, there is no overlapping territory, even 
though the line of separation may in some instances be 
difficult of exact ascertainment.29
In keeping with Baker, the court regarded the utility patent regime as 
having supremacy over any claim of copyright in human creations that 
were patentable subject matters.30 The Seventh Circuit thought it would 
be “intolerable” to allow Taylor to use copyright to extend its monopoly 
in these charts.31 The Supreme Court’s Mazer decision confirmed the 
“mutual exclusiv[ity]” of copyright and patent protections, citing 
favorably to Baker, Taylor, and other Baker progeny.32
Consistent with these decisions, courts should interpret the scope of 
copyright protection for software narrowly to avoid providing patent-like 
protection to functional aspects of software for which its creator did not 
seek a patent.33 Copyright law should not serve as a gap-filler for 
functional aspects of programs for which patent protection is unavailable, 
either because these aspects of programs lack novelty or nonobviousness 
or because they are too abstract for patenting.34 If the functional design 
has been patented, it should be disqualified from copyright protection.35
Allowing otherwise would defeat an essential purpose of the patent 
system, which requires claimants to meet higher qualitative standards and 
undergo more rigorous review to acquire exclusive rights, and even then, 
                                                                                                                     
29. Id. at 99.
30. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA.
L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2017); Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, What’s 
Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 492 (2017) 
(discussing patent preemption of other IP rules).
31. Taylor, 139 F.2d at 101.
32. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 n.33 (1954). Mazer and the Oracle decision’s 
misinterpretation of it are discussed infra Section III.B.
33. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 83 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 OTA REPORT].
34. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2360 (2014), which struck down patent claims for a method and system for managing financial 
settlement risks as too abstract to be patent subject matter, it is clearer than ever that some aspects 
of software are too abstract to qualify for either copyright or patent protections.
35. See infra Part III for a discussion of this issue.
9
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for a shorter duration.36 Courts should not allow software developers to 
bypass those standards and procedures merely by asserting copyright in 
a software SSO innovation. It is a fundamental tenet of patent law that 
unpatented technological innovations are in the public domain and 
available for free reuses (unless they can be maintained as trade secrets).37
Unfortunately, applying these uncontroversial propositions in 
software IP cases has sometimes been difficult because the precise 
contours of copyrightable expression and patentable systems and 
processes in software are sometimes, to use Taylor’s words, “difficult of 
exact ascertainment.”38 Structural design elements of programs, such as 
the APIs and command structures at issue in Oracle, exemplify this 
problem. It is nevertheless important for courts to make concerted efforts 
to discern patent and copyright boundaries and to resist construing 
copyright to give patent-like protections to nonliteral elements of 
programs. The CAFC’s broad interpretation of copyright in Oracle, as 
well as its endorsement of copyright/patent overlaps, provides fuel for 
undermining these fundamental norms. Articulation of these principles 
should inform our understanding of Congress’s decision to utilize 
copyright as a form of protection for software and also to narrow its scope 
to prevent it from becoming a substitute for patenting.
A. Overcoming Initial Conceptual Difficulties in Applying
IP Rights to Software
In the earliest days of the computer and software industries, 
developers created many thousands of programs without asserting either 
copyright or patent protections.39 When developers wanted to claim 
proprietary rights in programs, they typically maintained source codes as 
                                                                                                                     
36. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“[T]he results of 
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise 
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.”).
37. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(“The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody a congressional 
understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, 
to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.”).
38. Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99 (7th Cir. 1943). Discerning 
copyright/patent boundaries is sometimes difficult in non-software contexts as to puzzles, toys, 
games, and architecture. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1516–17; see also Kevin Emerson 
Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603, 1643–44 (2017) (discussing 
this difficulty for architectural works).
39. See, e.g., MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE 
HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 3 (2003) (discussing historical and empirical 
perspectives on the development of the software industry and various business models that 
supported it). Much software was “bundled” with hardware. Id. at 6. IBM’s eventual “unbundling” 
of software and hardware under some pressure from antitrust authorities was an important 
development that contributed to the growth of an independent software industry. Id.
10
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trade secrets and licensed the use of machine-executable codes to 
customers.40 Yet, trade secrecy was, by its nature, unsuited to be the sole 
form of IP protection for software in the marketplace because mass-
market distribution would publish the secrets.41
Once copyright and patent officials were confronted with claims of IP 
rights in programs in the mid-1960s, it became apparent that software was 
an awkward fit for both regimes.42 Programs were too much of a 
technology to fit comfortably in the copyright regime and too much of a 
writing to fit comfortably in the patent system.
In 1965, the Register of Copyright decided, with some reluctance, to 
accept registrations for computer programs as long as their authors 
supplied the full texts of their source codes for deposit with the U.S. 
Copyright Office and complied with copyright notice requirements.43
Those registrations were issued, however, under the Office’s “rule of 
doubt.”44 One doubt was whether copyright protection could extend to 
machine-executable forms of programs, which are virtual machines and 
machine processes.45 A second doubt was whether machine-executable 
                                                                                                                     
40. Trade secrecy and licensing remain important ways for software developers to protect 
their digital assets. See, e.g., 1 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW & DATA 
PRIVACY LAW § 3.03 (2018) (including sections on trade secret and licensing agreements, among 
others, as types of practical and effective software protection).
41. See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1475–78 (D. Nev. 1983) 
(denying trade secrecy claim for videogame program). The court noted that copyright law would 
have provided a more useful way to protect the plaintiff’s code against unlicensed copying; trade 
secrecy could not, however, serve as a substitute form of IP protection after copies of the programs 
had circulated in the marketplace. Id. at 1477.
42. Justice Breyer’s tenure article regarded the “case” for extending either copyright or 
patent protection to computer programs to be at best “uneasy” and actually quite unpersuasive. 
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, 
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970). Adequate incentives for the 
development of computer software existed, including business models that did not depend on IP 
rights. Id. at 344–50 (describing economics of software development). See generally Pamela 
Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 1746 
(2011) for a contemporary assessment of Breyer’s analysis.
43. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 31D (Jan. 1965), reprinted in Duncan M. Davidson, 
Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 652 n.72 
(1983).
44. Davidson, supra note 43, at 739. Copyright Office policy is to register a claim to 
copyright under the “rule of doubt” if it “has reasonable doubt as to whether the material submitted 
for registration constitutes copyrightable subject matter or whether the other legal and formal 
requirements of the statute have been met.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 607 (3d ed. 2017).
45. In the first copyright case based on the copying of machine-executable code, a trial court 
rejected a copyright claim because the code was a “mechanical device” ineligible for copyright 
protection. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065–69 (N.D. Ill. 
1979) (noting failure to satisfy notice of copyright requirements), aff’d on other grounds, 628
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
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code could be considered a “copy” of the source code under copyright 
precedents.46 Perhaps in part because of these doubts, the Office 
registered relatively few programs in the 1960s and 1970s.47
In 1967, during congressional hearings on proposed bills to overhaul 
U.S. copyright law,48 one witness warned against software copyrights as 
likely to confer “patentlike protection under the guise of copyright.”49
Seemingly in response to those concerns, Congress added a provision to 
the copyright revision bill that, as enacted in the Copyright Act of 1976 
(1976 Act),50 became § 102(b): “In no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is . . . embodied in such work.”51 The legislative 
history expressly stated that it had been added to the statute to ensure that 
computer program copyrights would not be construed too broadly.52
During this same period, the U.S. Patent Office was struggling with
whether to issue patents for programs and for processes embodied in 
programs. It perceived programs to be unpatentable printed matter (that 
                                                                                                                     
46. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1908) (stating 
piano rolls are not “copies” of musical compositions, but essential parts of machines that were 
unreadable by humans). The Data Cash decision analogized source code to architectural drawings 
and object code to buildings constructed from those drawings. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1068 
(citing Nucor Corp. v. Tenn. Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386, 391 n.8 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(stating that a building is not a “copy” of drawings, but a “result” of them)). Architectural works 
only became copyrightable subject matter in the U.S. in 1991. Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–06, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990).
47. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
34 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] (reporting that IBM and Burroughs accounted for more 
than 80% of the 1,205 programs registered before 1977). The source code disclosure requirement 
may have discouraged registrations. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 14, at 1058. Moreover, many 
software developers had adopted business models not dependent on IP rights. Breyer, supra note 
42, at 344–45.
48. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 969–74 (1967), 
reprinted in 9 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 192–97 (George S. 
Grossman ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings]; see also Armstrong, supra note 17, at 
137–38 (discussing these hearings).
49. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 197 (testimony of Arthur Miller). Professor 
Miller also believed that Congress should not allow programmers to use copyright to protect 
efficient program innovations without meeting patent law’s procedural or substantive standards. 
Id.
50. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 
(2012)).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes 
Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007), for a 
detailed history of this provision and the caselaw it was intended to codify. It is worth noting that 
processes are among the subject matters of patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
52. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976).
12
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is, writings of authors) and program processes to be unpatentable mental 
processes.53 The Patent Office’s opposition to software patents stiffened 
after a presidential commission in 1966 rebuffed a proposal that program 
innovations be made patentable.54 The Commission expressed concern 
about the Patent Office’s competence to judge the patentability of 
software innovations because the Office lacked an appropriate database 
of prior art and a suitable classification system.55 Substantial progress had 
been made in the programming field without patents, and besides, 
copyright protection was available for programs.56
Notwithstanding the Presidential Commission’s statement, some 
doubts lingered about whether machine-executable forms of programs 
were indeed copyright-protectable, even after passage of the 1976 Act.57
These doubts were put to rest by the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in the late 1970s.58
                                                                                                                     
53. Any process or system for which a computer program can be written can also be 
instantiated in hardware. Patenting seems appropriate if one accepts, as one must, the equivalence 
of hardware and software and recognizes that software is a virtual machine. See generally Pamela 
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other 
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990), for a more extensive 
treatment of the problems with software-related patents. The law review literature on software 
patents is vast. See, e.g., James P. Chandler, Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 1 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 33, 36–38 n.15 (2000) (reporting that over 200 articles were written about 
patenting of computer programs between 1970 and 1979, over 500 between 1980 and 1989, and 
well over 1,000 between 1990 and 2000, with citations to a substantial number of them).
54. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS 
OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY, S. DOC. NO. 91-5, at 21 (1st Sess. 
1967) (“Uncertainty now exists as to whether the statute permits a valid patent to be granted on 
programs. Direct attempts to patent programs have been rejected on the ground of nonstatutory 
subject matter. Indirect attempts to obtain patents and avoid the rejection, by drafting claims as a 
process, or a machine or components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather than as a 
program itself, have confused the issue further and should not be permitted.”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The 1976 Act initially had a placeholder provision in 17 U.S.C. § 117 preserving the 
state of the law (whatever that was) as to computer software. See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU 
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable 
Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 696–98 (1984).
58. CONTU was established by Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974). See CONTU
REPORT, supra note 47, app. B. It was created to address several new technology issues that had 
been holding up enactment of the revised copyright bill; namely, to what extent photocopying of 
in-copyright materials was infringement, whether inputting a copyrighted work into a computer 
would infringe copyright, whether databases were copyrightable, and whether computer-
generated works could be copyrighted. Id. CONTU provided guidelines about photocopying, id.
at 48–78, and concluded that inputting a copyrighted work into a computer could infringe 
copyright, id. at 39–40, that databases could be copyrighted if original, id. at 38–40, and that 
computer-generated works could be copyrighted if original, id. at 45. The copyrightability of 
computer programs was not in its initial charter. Weinreb, supra note 14, at 1165. Perhaps because 
13
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CONTU strongly endorsed copyright protection for computer 
programs,59 albeit over vigorous dissents expressing concerns about 
copyright protecting highly functional works.60 CONTU concluded that 
of the existing legal regimes, copyright was the most suitable form of IP 
protection.61 It noted that Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt about 
the patentability of program innovations.62 The uncertainty of patents 
made copyright seem like a better choice.63 CONTU expressed 
confidence that courts would be able to apply traditional principles of 
copyright law to programs.64 Soon after CONTU issued its report, 
                                                                                                                     
Congress had not expected CONTU to address the software issue, none of the CONTU 
Commissioners had expertise in computer or software technologies. Id. at 1166–69.
59. CONTU REPORT, supra note 47, at 12 (asserting that computer programs were already 
copyrightable under the 1976 Act). There was, however, more ambiguity on this point than 
CONTU acknowledged. See Samuelson, supra note 57, at 703; Armstrong, supra note 17, at 143–
44.
60. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 47, at 27–37 (dissent of John Hersey) (arguing that 
programs were too functional to be copyright subject matter and failed to communicate the works’ 
expression to humans as other copyrighted works do); see also id. at 37–38 (dissent of Rhoda 
Karpatkin).
61. See id. at 16–18 (comparing copyright with other existing IP regimes).
62. Id. at 17 (noting the Court’s doubts about the patentability of program innovations). The 
Court unanimously ruled against the patentability of a program algorithm in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (holding the method for transforming binary coded decimals to pure binary 
form too abstract to be patentable). While CONTU was still deliberating about software 
protections, the Court issued another anti-software patent decision in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 594 (1978) (ruling against a claim for a software-implemented process for updating alarm 
limits for catalytic conversion systems). See also Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229–30 (1976) 
(holding data processing claims ineligible for patenting). Not until after the 5-4 decision in 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–93 (1981), which upheld a patent for a rubber-curing 
process that utilized a program, did patents begin to become a viable form of protection for certain 
aspects of software.
63. CONTU did not consider the possibility of sui generis (of its own kind) form of IP 
protection for software, although some had suggested this option. See, e.g., World Intell. Prop. 
Org. [WIPO], Rep. of the Int’l Bureau on the Legal Protection of Computer Software, U.N. Doc. 
LPCS/1/2, at 4 (1979); Elmer Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to Protect Computer 
Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 280, 283–92 (1970); Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried 
View of Copyright: Proposals and Prospects, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 831, 843 (1966) (“[W]e ought 
to be thinking, not copyright, but patent, or perhaps a third quiddity . . . as we are told that the 
programs, or some of them, can be translated, so to speak, into physical parts of the computer’s 
machinery or circuitry.”). An important advantage of a copyright, rather than a sui generis, model 
of IP protection for software was the existence of international treaties under which software 
might be subsumed (as “literary works”), and hence protected internationally. Under a sui generis 
option, a new treaty would have had to be negotiated, which might not have been as protective of 
software innovations as copyright.
64. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 47, at 16. But see infra note 73 and accompanying 
text.
14
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Congress in 1980 amended the 1976 Act to effectuate CONTU’s 
recommendations.65
B. The Road to Whelan v. Jaslow and Concerns About Copyright 
Conferring Patent-Like Protections to Software
In the first four years after the 1980 amendments, courts rendered 
twenty-four software copyright decisions. Virtually all of them raised 
relatively straightforward issues.66 None seemed to bear out earlier 
warnings about copyright giving patent-like protections to software. The 
infringement claims were overwhelmingly based on copying of 
audiovisual elements of videogames,67 exact copying of code,68 or both.69
However, in 1985, software copyright caselaw turned dicey. All five 
of the software copyright cases decided that year involved “nonliteral” 
infringement claims, that is, claims that the defendants copied structural 
elements of computer programs.70 CONTU had emphasized the 
                                                                                                                     
65. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 
(2012)) (defining “computer program” and creating a limitation enabling copying incidental to 
use, backup copying, necessary adaptations, and resales of one’s copy). CONTU recommended 
that “rightful possessors” have these § 117 rights. CONTU REPORT, supra note 47, at 12. As 
enacted, only owners of copies of computer programs have these rights. 17 U.S.C. § 117. Software 
firms have sometimes successfully used mass-market licenses to override § 117 rights to resell 
software. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (enforcing 
a mass-market license restriction forbidding resale of software).
66. But see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the sale of chips to speed up play of another firm’s videogame infringed the 
derivative work right); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Mgmt. Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
450, 457–58 (D. Idaho 1983) (finding that altering another firm’s code to enable its customers to 
access additional features infringed).
67. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming a 
preliminary injunction for infringement of videogame audiovisuals); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips 
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619–20 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming a preliminary injunction 
due to the similarities in characters and total concept and feel of videogames), superseded by 
statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 
1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 229 (D. Md. 
1981) (holding that a videogame copyright was not infringed).
68. See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 526–27 (9th Cir. 
1984) (affirming a preliminary injunction against the exact copying of Apple operating system 
programs), overruled by Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc., v. Precision Lift, Inc. 654 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 
2011); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254–55 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction against the exact copying of object code); GCA 
Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 722–23 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (granting a preliminary 
injunction against the exact copying of operating system programs).
69. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 878 (3d Cir. 1982). In 
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the court found infringement of 
a copyright in the plaintiff’s program code, but not in its videogame graphics. Id. at 754.
70. See Q-Co. Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Williams 
v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 572–73 (D. Mass. 1985); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 
15
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importance of distinguishing copyrightable program expression and 
uncopyrightable program process, but had offered no guidance about how 
courts should go about doing so, saying only that the distinction did not 
“shimmer with clarity.”71
None of these first nonliteral infringement cases made any effort to 
assess the applicability of the § 102(b) functionality exclusions (that is,
procedure, process, system, and method of operation).72 Courts generally 
sought to resolve these nonliteral software copyright infringement claims 
by examining them through the lens of cases involving conventional 
“literary works” and assuming that if the structure of novels and plays 
could be expressive parts of those works, then the structure of programs 
should also be copyright-protectable.73
The most troubling decision was Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory, Inc.,74 which involved competing programs to 
automate common functions of dental laboratories.75 Jaslow’s main 
                                                                                                                     
623 F. Supp. 1485, 1487 (D. Minn. 1985); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Comput. Sys., Inc., 605 F. 
Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 
1307, 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). All five involved claims of 
infringement for copying internal structures of software. The plaintiffs prevailed in all of these 
cases except Q-Co.
71. CONTU REPORT, supra note 47, at 18. Nearly forty years later, this continues to be true. 
See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 17, at 156.
72. A § 102(b) exclusion should have been dispositive in Williams. The copyright claim 
arose because Arndt developed software that implemented Williams’ method for trading in 
commodities. The court upheld Williams’ claim because the two programs contained the same set 
of steps (i.e., they implemented the same procedure) and produced the same results. Williams, 626 
F. Supp. at 579. Arndt may have breached Williams’ confidence and been a bit of a liar, id. at 
573–75, 580–81, but he wrote his own program to implement the plaintiff’s method. Under 
traditional principles of copyright law, Arndt should have prevailed in the copyright case. 1986
OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 81.
73. See, e.g., SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 829–31. The Third Circuit’s decision in Whelan Assocs., 
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986), characterized programs as 
“literary works” whose structure could be as expressive as the structure of novels and plays.
74. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 1309. The district court should have analyzed the § 102(b) process exclusion 
because similarities in the parties’ programs were due to both having designed them to implement 
the same set of dental lab business processes. The district court characterized the copyright-
protectable expression in programs as “the manner in which the program operates, controls, and 
regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing 
useful information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communication.” Id. at 1320. The 
Third Circuit cited approvingly to this definition of program expression. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 
1239. Notice that if one substitutes the word “method” for “manner” in the court’s statement, the 
sentence still makes sense. These aspects of software should have been unprotectable methods 
under § 102(b). The trial court thought that prospective users would perceive no differences 
between the Whelan and Jaslow programs. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1322. It was as if performing 
the same functions in the same manner necessarily infringed. See 1986 OTA REPORT, supra note 
16
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defense was that copyright protected only program code, not program 
structure.76 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s finding of infringement based on similarities in the two 
programs’ file structures, in the sequences of five subroutines, and in their 
“overall structure.”77 The court’s decision introduced the concepts of 
“structure, sequence, and organization” (SSO) and the “look and feel” of 
programs as potentially eligible for copyright protection.78 The court 
reasoned that a great deal of intellectual creativity had gone into the 
design of the program structures and look-and-feel and that without broad 
copyright protection for such program innovations there would be too 
little incentive to create valuable programs.79 The court announced a test 
for judging nonliteral infringement in software copyright cases under 
which “the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s 
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function 
would be part of the expression of the idea.”80
Whelan precipitated numerous software copyright lawsuits involving 
nonliteral infringement claims. Plaintiffs in those cases relied heavily on 
Whelan’s endorsement of copyright protection for program SSO and 
often applied its test for infringement.81 “Look and feel” lawsuits also 
proliferated, the most prominent of which were Lotus Development Corp. 
                                                                                                                     
33, at 81 (suggesting that unfair competition concerns explained Whelan and other nonliteral 
infringement cases).
76. Although the district court did not discuss Jaslow’s theory of the case, it is evident in 
the Third Circuit’s decision. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235.
77. Id. at 1233–34, 1242–48. The court rejected Jaslow’s argument that the file structures 
were like the blank forms in Baker. Id. at 1242–43. The subroutines that carried out standard 
business methods (for example, for close-of-day and close-of-month operations and the like), id.
at 1245, should have been excluded from copyright under § 102(b).
78. See id. at 1224, 1229, 1231. The court suggested that copyright protection should be 
available for program “look and feel,” quoting an article stating that designing look-and-feel 
requires considerable creativity and “often is of greater commercial value than the program code.” 
Id. at 1231. “Look and feel” claims are no longer found in the software copyright caselaw.
79. Id. at 1237–38.
80. Id. at 1236.
81. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176–77 
(9th Cir. 1989) (affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction based on the copying of a program 
structure); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass. 
1990) (holding that copying a spreadsheet program command structure constituted infringement, 
citing Whelan); Pearl Sys. Inc. v. Competition Elecs. Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1520, 1524 (S.D. 
Fla. 1988) (protecting SSO, following Whelan); Digital Commc’ns. Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. 
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 454–55 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (characterizing Whelan as “[t]he leading case 
addressing the extent of [copyright] protection”); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the “overall structure, sequencing, 
and arrangement” of a greeting card preparation program fell within the “ambit of copyright 
protection”).
17
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v. Paperback Software International, Inc.82 and Apple Computer Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp.83
In the mid-to-late 1980s, as the Whelan-inspired SSO and look-and-
feel cases were being litigated,84 the CAFC was taking an increasingly 
broad view of the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr85
as having opened the door to the patenting of software innovations.86
After Diehr, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) became more liberal 
in its issuance of such patents.87 The upsurge in software patenting in the 
mid-to-late 1980s might have been even greater but for decisions such as 
Whelan, which “lessened the need to rely on patents as the primary legal 
protection for software.”88
C. Rising Concerns About Overbroad Copyrights and Software Patents
By the mid-1980s, ever-growing concerns about uncertain and 
overbroad software copyrights and the rise of software patents among IP 
and computing professionals came to the attention of members of 
Congress. These concerns prompted a request that the Office of 
                                                                                                                     
82. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
83. 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), aff’g 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The day after 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. v. Whelan Assocs., Inc., 479 U.S. 
1031 (1987), Lotus filed its first “look and feel” lawsuit. Complaint, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Paperback Software Int’l, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (No. 1:87CV00076). The Apple 
v. Microsoft case is discussed infra Section II.B.3.
84. At least one court declined to follow the Whelan approach to judging software copyright 
infringement. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Comput. Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 
1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction for copyright 
infringement because many similarities between the parties’ programs were “dictated by the 
externalities of the cotton market” and explaining why it declined to follow Whelan).
85. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
86. The Diehr decision was generally viewed for some years as having opened up only a 
narrow window for software-related patents. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 53, at 1095–96
(discussing Diehr). This was partly because the Supreme Court had split 5-4 on the patent claim, 
which involved an improved rubber curing process that used a program as one element. Diehr,
450 U.S. at 176; see also Maureen A. O’Rourke, The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward
Patenting Software, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 212–13 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (discussing the facts of Diehr).
87. See John T. Soma & B.F. Smith, Software Trends: Who’s Getting How Many of What? 
1978 to 1987, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 415, 419–20 (1989) (explaining that the 
average number of software patents granted between 1978 and 1981 was nine per year, which 
increased to thirty-four in 1984 and to sixty-six in 1987, a 470% increase over this time period);
see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 55 tbl.2-1 (1992) 
[hereinafter 1992 OTA REPORT] (charting increases in the patenting of software inventions).
88. O’Rourke, supra note 86, at 214.
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Technology Assessment (OTA) study software IP issues and report about 
these developments.89
In 1986, the OTA reported to Congress that “neither copyright nor 
patent law ha[d] successfully accommodated works of function, such as 
computer programs.”90 Copyright seemed to provide either “too much”
or “too little” protection for program innovations.91 If copyright 
protection was only available to literal code, it would be easy to rewrite 
the same program design in non-infringing source code, but if copyright 
protection “extended to the logic, design, structure, performance or even 
the output of the computer program,” this would provide too much 
protection and violate the strictures of § 102(b).92 The OTA pointed to 
Whelan and two other 1985 nonliteral infringement decisions as 
examples of the “too much” approach.93 The OTA warned that “[o]verly 
broad copyright protection would give the owner patent-like protection 
over processes for a much longer duration than patent law provides,” and
that it would do so without satisfying the more rigorous procedural and 
substantive requirements of the patent system.94
The OTA’s concerns were echoed in a large number of articles 
published in the late 1980s that were strongly critical of Whelan.95 One 
article characterized the decision as “The ‘First Ever’ Patent Based on 
Copyright Relief.”96 The Whelan test for infringement “make[s] 
everything ‘new’ about the program susceptible to copyright protection, 
including any patentable ideas, without regard to the requirements of 
                                                                                                                     
89. See 1986 OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at ii.
90. Id. at 59.
91. Id. at 78. Breyer had also worried that copyright could provide too much or too little 
protection to software. Breyer, supra note 42, at 347–48; see also Samuelson et al., supra note 
13, at 2356–61 (expressing concern about probable cycles of over- and under-protection in 
software copyright cases).
92. 1986 OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 81.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 83.
95. See, e.g., Marjorie Hope Kaufman, Pearl Systems, Functionality, Protection for 
Structure, and the Boundaries of Copyright Protection: An Ad Hoc Forum, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 1,
1–2 (1989); Menell, supra note 14, at 1074, 1082; Reichman, supra note 14, at 697, 714; D. C. 
Toedt, Bonito Boats and the Primacy of the Patent System—Are There Implications for Software 
Functionality Copyrights?, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 12, 12–15 (1989); Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, 
Process, or Protected Expression? Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the 
Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 881 (1990); Peter G. Spivack, Comment, 
Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723, 744 (1988).
96. John P. Sumner & Steven W. Lundberg, Patentable Computer Program Features as 
Uncopyrightable Subject Matter, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 237, 239 (1989); see also Michael Gemignani, 
Copyright Protection: Computer-Related Dependent Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
383, 403–05 (1989) (criticizing Whelan for adopting a patent-like standard of infringement).
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patentability.”97 In addition, granting protection to all program SSO 
would risk giving programmers patent-like protection through copyright, 
which could have a chilling effect on software development and ongoing 
innovation.98 Whelan wrongly assumed that there was only one 
unprotectable idea per program and failed to filter, during infringement 
analysis, several types of unprotectable elements of programs, including 
efficient designs and interfaces necessary for achieving interoperability 
with hardware or software.99
Moreover, IP experts concluded that courts needed to recognize that 
many programming design objectives are functional, such as 
optimization of computing speed, efficient use of memory, input/output 
functioning, ease of testing, maintenance and enhancement, and the need 
to “achieve compatibility.”100 Whelan failed to recognize these design 
constraints and to interpret the process and method of operation 
exclusions required by § 102(b).101 Software should be accorded a lesser 
level of copyright protection to avoid protecting its functional 
elements.102 Moreover, the terms “SSO” and “look and feel” were
unhelpful in distinguishing protectable and unprotectable aspects of 
programs.103
Lawyers were not the only people concerned about software IP 
developments. The Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of 
the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) hosted two forums to discuss 
worrisome trends in software copyright and patent law that posed risks to 
ongoing innovation and growth in the software industry.104 Among other 
things, its report pointed out that it was not always easy to determine 
which law should apply to nonliteral elements of programs:
                                                                                                                     
97. Sumner & Lundberg, supra note 96, at 240; see also Lundberg et al., supra note 16, at 
248 (“If a statutory utility patent claim can be written on a functional, utilitarian feature specified 
by a computer program, the feature is by definition an idea to which copyright protection does not 
apply.” (emphasis omitted)).
98. See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial 
Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 630 
(1988). David Nimmer is, of course, co-author (with his late father) of the Nimmer treatise. 
Insights of this article were carried over into the treatise. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER 2018, supra
note 17, § 13.03[F].
99. Nimmer et al., supra note 98, at 629–30, 639–40.
100. Chisum et al., supra note 18, at 19–22.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 18–19.
103. Id. at 20, 27.
104. See generally STEERING COMM. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. ISSUES IN SOFTWARE ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE (1991) [hereinafter IP ISSUES] (discussing the 
changing context of the software industry and the legal issues resulting from innovation).                                           
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[C]opyright attorneys can argue cogently that disputes over
the ownership of graphical displays and the sequencing of 
commands—that is the look and feel of user interfaces—
should be resolved in the copyright arena because the issues 
center on creative expression. Objecting to the subjectivity 
of copyright concepts, such as “look and feel” and 
“structure, sequence, and organization,” patent attorneys 
argue just as persuasively that the issues can be addressed 
more concretely by assessing the novelty and 
nonobviousness of useful processes incorporated into 
interfaces.105
No consensus emerged on the appropriate roles of copyright and patent 
in protecting software.106
The swirling controversies about software IP issues induced the 
House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice to hold a set of oversight hearings about 
computers and intellectual property in 1989 and 1990.107 In advance of 
the hearings, the OTA prepared a document about the SSO and look-and-
feel lawsuits, stating, “[a]t stake in these decisions is the extent to which 
copyright should be interpreted to give patent-like protection, albeit for a 
much longer period of time and without patent’s high standards for 
innovation and originality.”108
At one of the hearings, two prominent software developers expressed 
concerns about overprotection of software by copyright law, as well as 
about the harm that could be done to competition and ongoing innovation 
in the software industry if patents came to play a more substantial role.109
After hearing this and other testimony, Representative Robert 
Kastenmeier stated: “I must confess that I have difficulty comprehending 
the difference between where a patent might be applied for or where it is 
more appropriate to copyright, or maybe simultaneously apply to both, or
neither.”110
                                                                                                                     
105. Id. at 62.
106. Id. at 62–72 (discussing different views on the patent/copyright interface, potential 
benefits and harms from software patents, and compatibility and standardization issues).
107. See generally Computers and Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
(1989 & 1990) [hereinafter House Hearings] (conducting an oversight hearing to address 
challenges in computers and intellectual property). 
108. Id. at 23. OTA posed questions that the oversight hearings should address. Id. at 24–25. 
I testified at that hearing, raising concerns from IP lawyers about overlapping copyright and patent 
protections for software. See id. at 92–95 (testimony of Pamela Samuelson).
109. See id. at 223–36 (testimony of Daniel S. Bricklin); id. at 238–43 (testimony of Mitchell 
D. Kapor).
110. Id. at 247.
21
Samuelson: Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of Pa
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
264 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
The hearings raised sufficient alarm about overlapping copyright and 
patent protections for software to convince the congressional committees 
tasked with overseeing IP legislation to ask the PTO and the Copyright 
Office to prepare a joint study about whether patent and copyright 
provided overlapping protections for software.111 In addition, the OTA 
prepared a follow-up report that expressed continuing concern about the 
software copyright caselaw, especially the controversies about copyright 
claims for SSO and interfaces.112 The report noted that no consensus
about how to distinguish copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable 
processes had yet emerged, and that some copyright cases seemed to 
extend protection to program functionality, contrary to the strictures of 
§ 102(b).113 Because courts were stretching copyright to protect 
nonliteral aspects of programs, the OTA identified options that Congress 
should consider, including further amendments to the 1976 Act and 
creation of a sui generis regime for software to displace or complement 
copyright.114
Interest in creating a sui generis regime for software diminished in the 
1990s as courts came to conceive of programs as highly utilitarian, and 
of their utilitarian elements as more suitable for patent than copyright 
protections. To avoid Whelan-like overprotection, courts developed a set 
of doctrinal strategies to ensure that copyright law would not confer 
patent-like protections on program innovations, which warded off the 
overprotection problem—at least until the CAFC’s 2014 Oracle decision.
II. TAKING THE UTILITARIAN NATURE OF PROGRAMS AND AVAILABILITY 
OF PATENTS INTO ACCOUNT IN SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT CASES
The tide turned against overbroad copyright decisions with the Second 
Circuit’s landmark decision in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc.115 Altai recognized that the utilitarian nature of computer 
programs gave rise to a need to filter out many types of unprotectable 
elements before proceeding to judge copyright infringement in software 
cases.116 After Altai, appellate courts in many circuits began to take into 
                                                                                                                     
111. See OVERLAP STUDY, supra note 15, at 1–2. This resulted in a 1991 report saying that 
there was no overlapping terrain in the legal protections that copyright and patent provided to 
software. It concluded that copyright protected program expression, and patent law protected 
program functions. See id. at 90. For more discussion of this study, see infra notes 148–50, 175–
77 and accompanying text.
112. See 1992 OTA REPORT, supra note 87, at 16–23, 69–73.
113. Id. at 9–10, 22.
114. Id. at 29–31. There was robust interest among scholars in the sui generis option in the 
late 1980s and early to mid-1990s. See Samuelson et al., supra note 13, at 2312 n.6 (citing to the 
ample scholarly literature about sui generis software IP).
115. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); see Samuelson et al., supra note 13, at 2359. 
116. Samuelson et al., supra note 13, at 2359–61.
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account that some nonliteral elements of programs might be patentable 
as a reason for copyright law to abjure protection of them.117 Although 
the doctrinal bases on which these decisions rested varied somewhat, the 
conclusions they reached were consistent: Copyright law should be 
construed narrowly to avoid conferring patent-like protections on 
functional design elements of programs.
A. Altai Narrowed Copyright Scope to Avoid Protecting Utilitarian 
Elements of Programs
Shortly after the OTA published its second report on software IP 
issues, the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Altai.118 Computer 
Associates claimed that Altai infringed by copying SSO designed to 
allow scheduling software to be compatible with IBM operating 
systems.119 The Second Circuit heavily criticized Whelan and 
characterized its test for software copyright infringement as inconsistent 
with traditional principles of copyright law, as resting on a flawed 
understanding of computer science, and as relying too heavily on 
“metaphysical distinctions,” failing to “place enough emphasis on 
practical considerations.”120
Altai invoked Baker as the “doctrinal starting point” of analysis in 
software and other utilitarian work cases.121 As “compared to aesthetic 
works, computer programs hover even more closely to the elusive 
boundary line described in § 102(b).”122 While broad copyright protection 
for software might seem “attractive from a pure policy perspective,” 
adopting it would have “a corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets 
of copyright doctrine.”123
                                                                                                                     
117. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 27 (2001) (“As patent and copyright law overlap more 
and more, it becomes critical that they take account of each other.”).
118. Altai, 982 F.2d 693. One of my briefs played a small role in this case. See Pamela 
Samuelson et al., Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland 
Int’l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992) (No. 1:90-CV-11662). It was appended to Altai’s 
brief to the Second Circuit. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 13 n.3, Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (No. 
91-7893).
119. Altai, 982 F.2d at 698, 701.
120. Id. at 705–06. The Second Circuit noted that Whelan had met with a “mixed reception” 
in the caselaw and “ha[d] fared even more poorly in the academic community,” citing to several 
articles critical of Whelan for interpreting copyright too broadly. Id. at 705.
121. Id. at 704.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 712. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), had undercut Whelan’s incentive-based argument for 
broad software copyright protection. Altai, 982 F.2d at 711–12.
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To be true to these tenets in software copyright cases, Altai endorsed 
a three-step “abstraction, filtration, and comparison” (AFC) test for 
judging nonliteral infringement of software copyrights.124 The first step 
involves creation of a hierarchy of abstractions of the plaintiff’s program; 
the second step filters out unprotectable elements; the third step compares 
the remaining expressive elements of the plaintiff’s program with the 
defendant’s program to determine if the defendant’s program is 
substantially similar to expressive elements copied from the plaintiff’s 
program.125 Among the unprotectables are those elements dictated by 
efficiency, those constrained by external factors, such as the need to be 
compatible with hardware or software, and those in the public domain.126
The court agreed with the district court that the similarities between 
Altai’s and Computer Associates’ programs were constrained by external 
factors, namely, the need to be compatible with IBM programs.127
By 1994, the Altai approach to analyzing the scope of software 
copyrights had been endorsed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits,128 and was well on its way to becoming the 
preeminent software copyright decision,129 which it remains to this 
day.130 Although the Second Circuit gave little attention to the role that 
patent law did or should play in protecting software innovations, it 
recognized that patents might protect some software innovations.131
Altai’s emphasis on the highly utilitarian nature of programs at least 
implicitly suggests that patents might be more suitable than copyright to 
protect certain nonliteral elements of programs.132
                                                                                                                     
124. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706–11.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 707–10.
127. Id. at 714–15.
128. See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 
1994) (endorsing “thin” protection for software and filtration of many types of unprotectable 
elements, citing to Altai as “relying in part on our own approach”); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. 
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342 (5th Cir. 1994) (endorsing and applying the AFC 
test); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 841–42 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing 
approvingly to Altai and applying the AFC test); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing approvingly to Altai and its recognition that efficiency, external 
factors, and compatibility considerations constrained program design).
129. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 14–15 (characterizing Altai as the leading case on 
software copyright infringement).
130. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1296. Altai is the most cited of the software 
copyright cases.
131. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712 (citing Randell M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Plea for Due 
Processes: Defining the Proper Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 1103, 1123–25 (1991)).
132. The Second Circuit in Altai wisely focused on applying traditional limiting principles 
of copyright law to software rather than trying to define the boundaries of copyright protection 
24
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By construing the scope of copyright narrowly and insisting on 
filtration of efficient and other functional elements, Altai may have 
inadvertently contributed to a substantial increase in patenting of 
software-related inventions.133 As courts across the country adopted the 
AFC test, it became clear that copyright was going to provide a much 
“thinner” scope of protection to computer programs than during the 
Whelan heyday.134 This created incentives for software developers to 
seek and obtain software-related patents. Under the CAFC’s 1990s 
decisions in In re Alappat135 and State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc.,136 it became easier than ever to patent 
software innovations as long as the claimed inventions produced a 
“useful, concrete, and tangible result.”137 Software patents thus became a 
much more salient factor in the software IP landscape during the 1990s 
and 2000s.138
B. Doctrinal Strategies for Averting Overlapping Copyright and Patent 
Protections for Software
After Altai, appellate courts became more attentive to differentiating 
the roles of copyright and patent in protecting software innovation. These 
cases explicitly recognized the need to narrowly construe the scope of 
copyright in programs to avoid providing patent-like protection to 
                                                                                                                     
for software in relation to the boundaries of patents. Courts should recognize that both laws may 
have a role to play in protecting programs, but copyright and patent are not co-dependent such 
that the boundaries of one shape the boundaries of the other.
133. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 26 (“As software patents gain[ed] increasingly broad 
protection, whatever reasons there once were for broad copyright protection of computer 
programs [had] disappear[ed].” (footnote omitted)).
134. See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Feng Zhu, What Is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: 
Evidence from Lotus v. Borland 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11168, 
2005) (presenting evidence of a surge in patenting of software innovations in the mid-1990s). 
Although Lerner & Zhu attribute thin copyright protection to Borland, Altai was the more 
significant precedent.
135. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
136. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
137. State St., 149 F.3d at 1370 (upholding patent claims for a software-implemented 
financial services invention); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544–45 (upholding a patent claim for a 
software machine that smoothed wave forms for oscilloscopes).
138. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 86, at 216–18 (discussing the importance of Alappat
and State Street for software-related patents). Not until 2010 did patentable subject matter become
a renewed basis on which to strike down software-related patents. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 
(2010). In Bilski, the Supreme Court ruled that a method of hedging the risk of price fluctuations 
of commodities was too abstract to be patentable. Id. at 611–12. Bilski presaged the eventual 
narrowing of patent subject matter for software-related innovations, as happened in the Court’s 
2014 Alice decision. See generally, e.g., Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of 
Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532 (2015) (discussing the impact of 
Alice on the validity of many software-related patents).
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program innovations through copyright.139 This Section identifies five 
doctrinal strategies that courts have adopted to avoid software 
copyright/patent overlaps. Each strategy is a variation on the general 
theme of distinguishing copyright and patent subject matters that can be 
traced back to Baker. While it is useful to identify each of these doctrinal 
strands, there are fewer substantive differences than this Article’s 
categorization might suggest. In numerous cases, the courts invoked more 
than one of these strategies.140
1. The Layering Approach
Baker was the first decision to conceptualize copyright and patent as 
having distinct roles in protecting different intellectual creations.141
Copyright could provide one layer of protection for some aspects of 
original works of authorship (for example, Selden’s explanation of his 
bookkeeping system), but to get exclusive rights for a different layer (for 
example, the bookkeeping system embodied in Selden’s book) one must 
comply with rules of the patent system which regulates functional 
creativity in a different way than copyright regulates expressive or 
aesthetic creativity.142 This layering approach is evident in the software 
caselaw.
The CAFC was an early adopter of the concept of copyright and patent 
as playing different roles in the protection of software innovations in 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.143 In that decision, which 
upheld a preliminary injunction forbidding Atari from copying more of 
Nintendo programs than was necessary to achieve compatibility with the 
                                                                                                                     
139. Most strategies discussed herein have counterparts to those used to discern 
copyright/patent boundaries in non-software cases. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1494. The 
only strategy from the non-software cases lacking a counterpart in the software context is election 
of protection. Id. at 1508. The legal and policy arguments against copyright/patent overlaps 
developed in that article, id. at 1494–99, 1512–16, apply to software as well, although the 
boundaries of copyright and patent to software innovations are sometimes more difficult to discern 
than with non-software creations. See, e.g., 1986 OTA REPORT, supra note 33, at 59, 78–83.
140. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836–38, 849 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (remanding a software copyright case so the trial court could filter out unprotectable 
processes, merged elements, and scènes à faire elements).
141. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879); supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
142. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1517–21 (illustrating this strategy in non-software 
cases).
143. 975 F.2d 832, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Nintendo sued Atari for copying a data stream 
necessary to enable videogames to run on its platform. Id. at 836–37. Atari argued that this 
copying was justified because the digital stream was necessary for its videogames to be 
compatible with the Nintendo system. Id. at 845. The Atari program was written in a different 
programming language and ran on a different processor. Id. at 836.
26
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latter’s platform,144 the CAFC characterized copyright and patent laws as 
protecting “distinct aspects” of software.145 The role of copyright, it said, 
was to protect program expression, not methods or processes embedded 
in software, which might well be patentable.146 Moreover, programmers 
could not get patent-like protection for program methods and processes 
simply by embodying them in unintelligible forms (that is, object code) 
and then claiming copyright infringement when someone tried to 
understand the code (that is, by reverse engineering it to produce an 
approximation of the source code).147
The CAFC’s conclusion that copyright and patent protect distinct 
aspects of software was consistent with the PTO-Copyright Office 
Overlap Study’s main conclusion that there was “no overlap in subject 
matter: copyright protects the authorship in a set of statements that bring 
about a certain result in the operation of a computer, and patents cover 
                                                                                                                     
144. Id. at 845. For a critical analysis of Atari, see, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Reverse 
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-
Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1135, 1146 (1995). Like Professor Cohen, I have been 
more sympathetic to Atari’s defense than was the CAFC. Consider its statement that “Nintendo 
chose arbitrary programming instructions and arranged them in a unique sequence to create a 
purely arbitrary data stream” that unlocked the Nintendo console. Atari, 975 F.2d at 840 
(emphasis added). The CAFC asserted that “Nintendo may protect this creative element of the 
10NES under copyright.” Id. Yet courts have denied copyright claims because arbitrary choices 
do not satisfy copyright’s originality requirement. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 
F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that numbers assigned to lawnmower parts were not 
copyrightable because they were arbitrary).
Atari definitely hurt its case by lying to the Copyright Office when its lawyer asked for a 
copy of the registered Nintendo source code, saying it was needed to defend against an 
infringement claim (There was, at the time, no pending lawsuit). Atari, 975 F.2d at 836. Atari
used the source code to discern how to make its programs run on the Nintendo machines. Id. The 
CAFC ruled that Atari’s reproduction of the unauthorized copy obtained from the Copyright 
Office constituted infringement. Id. at 841–42. The lie also undermined Atari’s fair use and misuse 
defenses. Id. at 843–44, 847. Eventually the litigants settled this dispute. Cohen, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. at 1104. Atari is yet another example of a software copyright case decided more on unfair 
competition grounds than on traditional scope of copyright protection grounds.
145. Atari, 975 F.2d at 839; see also Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 
1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting that while the functional features of a game console were 
uncopyrightable, they might be patentable); MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 
1548, 1556–57 n.19 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing approvingly to Atari regarding copyright and patent 
protection of “distinct aspects” of software); Comput. Assoc. Int’l Inc. v Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 
544, 558, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that copyright protects program expression; methods and 
processes are better protected by patent than copyright), aff’d, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
146. Atari, 975 F.2d at 838–39. The CAFC invoked § 102(b) in support of this proposition. 
Id.
147. Id. at 842; see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525–26 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (finding that the use of copyrighted computer work to gain an understanding of 
unprotected functional elements was fair use).
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novel and nonobvious computer processes.”148 Copyright and patent were 
available to protect “totally different aspects” of program innovations.149
The Study cited the Supreme Court’s Baker decision as the “bedrock 
opinion for the view that patent and copyright are mutually exclusive.”150
The Study thus avoided the overlap problem by endorsing a layering 
approach to keep the boundaries of each law separate in protecting 
software innovations.
2. The § 102(b) Exclusion Approach
Consistent with the layering approach, and indeed often overlapping 
with it, are cases in which courts have explicitly invoked § 102(b)’s 
exclusion of methods and processes as a way to avoid copyright/patent 
overlaps in software cases.151 Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland 
International, Inc.152 is the best known of the software copyright cases in 
which the § 102(b) method exclusion was outcome-determinative.153
Under this approach, Borland was free to reuse the command hierarchy 
of Lotus 1-2-3 in its spreadsheet program because that hierarchy was a 
constituent part of an unprotectable method of operating a spreadsheet 
program.154 Borland’s briefs had highlighted § 102(b) as a mechanism for 
policing the boundaries of copyright and patent in the protection of 
software innovations.155 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit did not tie the rationale for the § 102(b) method exclusion to 
                                                                                                                     
148. Letter from Ralph Oman, Assoc. Librarian & Register of Copyrights, & Harry F. 
Manbeck, Assistant Sec’y & Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, to the Hon. William J. Hughes,
Chairmain, Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the Comm. on the Judiciary
(July 17, 1991), in OVERLAP STUDY, supra note 15 (transmitting the Overlap Study to the Chair 
of the House Subcommittee). The Study reported that “[p]atent protection is not available for 
computer programs per se” because they “consist of mental steps or printed matter.” OVERLAP 
STUDY, supra note 15, at iii, vii. It questioned the patentability of a “mere display on a screen of 
commands, menus, questions and answers, forms, or icons” because these user interface elements 
are “generally considered to be merely printed matter.” Id. at 45–46. Yet, processes to generate 
user interfaces might be eligible for patenting. Id. at 47. The Study discussed the possibility of 
design patent protection for icons. Id. at 46–47.
149. OVERLAP STUDY, supra note 15, at 2.
150. Id. at 19 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879)).
151. The § 102(b) exclusion approach differs somewhat from the layering approach insofar 
as courts tie its process and method exclusions directly to patentability considerations. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 120(b) (2012). Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., can, for instance, be conceptualized as a 
layering decision, but it did not tie the exclusion to patentable subject matter. 49 F.3d 807, 818 
(1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
152. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
153. Id. at 818. 
154. Id. at 816–17.
155. See Reply Brief of Defendant/Appellant Borland Int’l, Inc. at 42–50, Borland, 49 F.3d 
807 (No. 93-2214); see also Brief for Respondent at 22–46, Borland, 516 U.S. 233 (No. 94-2003)
[hereinafter Borland Brief] (making a similar argument in its Supreme Court brief).
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concerns about copyright being construed to give patent-like protections 
to functional aspects of software.156 For this reason, Borland is not the 
best illustration of the § 102(b) exclusion approach to discerning the 
copyright/patent boundaries.
A better example is MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Engineering Co.,157
in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied a § 102(b) process 
exclusion, emphasizing the connection between the § 102(b) process 
exclusion and the role of patents.158 MiTek and Arce were competitors in 
the market for wood truss drafting software.159 Due to numerous 
similarities between the two programs, especially their command 
structures, MiTek sued Arce for nonliteral copyright infringement.160
The district court ruled that the MiTek program’s menu command tree 
was an unprotectable process under § 102(b) because it mimicked the 
steps that a draftsman would typically follow in the process of designing 
trusses to support roofs for specific buildings.161 The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed, in part relying on § 102(b):162
[T]he idea of closely correlating the ACES program to the 
longhand steps taken by a draftsman was the constraining 
force in the design of the menu and submenu command tree 
structure. The logic inherent in this step-by-step process 
renders the resulting program unoriginal in that such logic 
may be expressed in only a limited number of ways. More 
than a minor departure from the logical sequence renders the 
result unusable.163
In a long footnote, the Eleventh Circuit opined that “[w]ere we to grant 
copyright protection to MiTek’s user interface, which is nothing more 
                                                                                                                     
156. Judge Boudin recognized that enforcing Lotus’ copyright against Borland might give 
Lotus patent-like protection. Borland, 49 F.3d at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring). However, he did 
not tie this concern to § 102(b).
157. 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996).
158. Id. at 1556.
159. Wood trusses are internal supports for the roofs of buildings. They are often designed 
off-site by engineers who work with site-specifications. The trusses are then constructed off-site 
and later brought to the building site for installation. Id. at 1551.
160. Id. at 1550–51.
161. Id. at 1556.
162. Id. at 1557.
163. Id. at 1558. The court relied on unoriginality and merger as well as § 102(b). Id. at 1557 
n.20. The court also rejected MiTek’s theory that the command structure was a protectable 
compilation. Id. The virtual identicality standard for copyright infringement of software user 
interfaces was not met in MiTek. Id. at 1558–59.
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than a process, we would be affording copyright protection to a process 
that is the province of patent law.”164
The functionality exclusions of § 102(b) and concerns about copyright 
not providing patent-like protections were also significant factors in the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.165
There, Sega sued Accolade for copyright infringement because Accolade 
made copies of Sega programs in reverse-engineering them to discern 
information about how to make its games successfully interoperate with 
the then-popular Genesis platform.166 Accolade then rewrote its 
videogames so that they too would run on that platform.167
Sega did not claim infringement based on Accolade’s 
reimplementation of the Sega interface in independently written 
software.168 The Ninth Circuit’s Accolade decision nonetheless ruled that 
the Sega interface was an unprotectable procedure under § 102(b).169 The
§ 102(b) exclusion was relevant to Accolade’s fair use defense because it 
reinforced Accolade’s argument that its purpose in making the reverse-
engineering copies was “to study the functional requirements for Genesis 
compatibility so that it could modify existing games and make them 
                                                                                                                     
164. Id. at 1556 n.19. Under the Supreme Court’s Alice decision, discussed infra notes 309–
12 and accompanying text, computerizing a wood truss drafting process would probably be 
ineligible for patenting. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 n.21 (11th Cir. 
1996) (“It is particularly important to exclude methods of operation and processes from the scope 
of copyright in computer programs because much of the contents of computer programs is 
patentable. Were we to permit an author to claim copyright protection for those elements of the 
work that should be the province of patent law, we would be undermining the competitive 
principles that are fundamental to the patent system.”).
165. 977 F.2d 1510, 1518, 1530 (9th Cir. 1992).
166. Id. at 1514–16.
167. Id. at 1515.
168. See, e.g., Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 
1361 (E.D. Va. 1989) (suggesting that compatibility defenses might succeed as long as the second-
comer had written its own implementation of a program interface); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., No. 
C-84-20799-WPG, 1989 WL 67434, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989). The goal of Sega’s lawsuit 
was to stop Accolade (and others) from reverse-engineering its programs. See, e.g., IP ISSUES,
supra note 104, at 77–78 (objecting to software reverse-engineering because it could be used to 
disguise infringement); Davidson, supra note 14, at 1093–99 (arguing that reverse-engineer 
copying was copyright infringement).
169. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522–23. The Ninth Circuit noted that “the functional 
requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console” were unprotectable by copyright, citing 
§ 102(b). Id. at 1522. These were the “interface procedures” for the Sega console that Accolade 
had used when it “wrote its own procedures based on what it had learned through disassembly.” 
Id. The court thus conceived of the Sega interface as an unprotectable procedure under § 102(b). 
Id. at 1522–23.
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usable with the Genesis console.”170 The court perceived there to be no 
other way for Accolade to get this information.171
The Ninth Circuit recognized that ruling in favor of Sega’s claim that 
disassembly of its programs constituted infringement would, in effect, 
grant Sega a “de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of [its] 
work—aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by 
Congress,” citing to § 102(b).172 The only way that Sega could obtain 
exclusive rights over an interface necessary for interoperability would be 
by “satisfy[ing] the more stringent standards imposed by the patent 
laws.”173 The Ninth Circuit considered Accolade’s reverse-engineering 
to have resulted in a public benefit because there were now more 
independently written programs available to owners of Genesis 
platforms.174
The MiTek and Accolade (Sega) holdings were consistent with the 
Overlap Study, which observed that underlying the debate over the proper 
scope of copyright in software was “the question of protection of 
functionality.”175 The Study opined that it would be contrary to the 
statutory exclusions set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) for copyright to
protect program functionality.176 Protection of functionality “is assigned 
to patents where a much more rigorous test must be undergone and the 
barriers to entry, in terms of time, cost, and complexity, are higher.”177
The Study also adhered to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Baker
and Mazer that copyright and patent were mutually exclusive.178
                                                                                                                     
170. Id. “Research” is one of the statutorily favored fair use purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2012). Accolade’s research purpose supported its fair use defense. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1521–
22.
171. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522–23. Accolade could have licensed the interface information 
from Sega, but decided against doing so because taking the license would have foreclosed 
Accolade’s development of videogames for other platforms. Id. at 1514.
172. Id. at 1526 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
173. Id. The court cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159–64 (1989), in support of this proposition and noted that Sega 
did not have a patent on the Genesis console. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526.
174. Id. at 1523. Sega was a large Japan-based information technology (IT) company, and 
Accolade was a U.S.-based startup. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, “Fifth Generation” Became 
Japan’s Lost Generation, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/05/ 
business/fifth-generation-became-japan-s-lost-generation.html [https://perma.cc/RDY7-A2HF]
(describing the U.S.’s considerable anxiety in the 1980s and early 1990s that Japanese companies 
would dominate the world IT industry). Accolade’s victory enabled American startups to compete 
in the videogame market.
175. OVERLAP STUDY, supra note 15, at 87.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 88.
178. See id. at iii.
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3. The Thin Protection Approach
Consistent with the layering and § 102(b) strategies, but different in 
emphasis, have been those decisions that adopted a “thin” copyright 
approach to judging infringement in software copyright cases as a way to 
ensure that copyright would not protect functional aspects of software. 
The first appellate court decision to adopt this approach was the Ninth 
Circuit in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.179 Apple claimed that 
Microsoft infringed Apple’s copyright in its graphical user interface 
(GUI) because the Windows GUI was substantially similar to the creative 
“look and feel” of the Apple GUI.180 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
district court that the Apple GUI was entitled to only “thin” protection.181
Under the thin protection doctrine, infringement could be found only if 
the Microsoft GUI was virtually identical to Apple’s.182
The district court explained that a “thin” protection approach was 
appropriate because many aspects of the Apple GUI were functional:
Purely functional items or an arrangement of them for 
functional purposes are wholly beyond the realm of 
copyright as are other common examples of user interfaces 
or arrangements of their individual elements—the dials, 
knobs, and remote control devices of a television or VCR, or 
the buttons and clocks of an oven or stove.183
                                                                                                                     
179. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446–47 (9th Cir. 1994), aff’g
799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The Ninth Circuit drew upon earlier caselaw holding that 
certain audiovisual elements of videogames should be subject to “thin” protection and a test of 
“virtually identical” copying. See, e.g., Frybarger v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530
(9th Cir. 1987) (“[I]ndispensable expression . . . based on the technical requirements of the 
videogame medium, may be protected only against virtually identical copying.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982), 
superseded by statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, 
Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that some expressive elements of the PAC-
MAN videogame were scènes à faire and only infringed by virtually identical copying); see also
Telemktg. Res. v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991, 1994–96 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d in part 
sub nom. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying 
analytic dissection and virtually identical standard to find defendant’s program not similar, citing 
Frybarger). The thin protection approach to managing copyright/patent boundaries has also been 
used in non-software contexts. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1533–35.
180. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1442. Apple argued that Microsoft’s GUI “virtually mimicked the 
composition, organization, arrangement and dynamics of the Macintosh interface, as shown by 
striking similarities in the animation of overlapping windows and the design, layout and animation 
of icons.” Id.
181. Id. at 1439.
182. Id. at 1439–40. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
to Microsoft because Apple was unwilling to go to trial under such a test. Id.
183. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1992), 
aff’d, 35 F.3d 1435; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 817 (1st Cir. 
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The user interface of a computer program was no less functional than 
those user interfaces.184 Similarities in functional elements of user 
interfaces or arrangements of them, said the district court, “does not 
suggest unlawful copying, but standardization across competing products 
for functional considerations.”185
The Ninth Circuit concurred in this “thin” protection approach and 
held that the district court had rightly applied “limiting doctrines of 
originality, functionality, standardization, scenes a faire, and merger” to 
each allegedly infringing element of the Apple GUI.186 Apple had, for 
example, designed its GUI so a cursor could be used to move a document 
icon to a trash can icon instead of using the delete key to dispose of 
unwanted items.187 The Ninth Circuit thought that this “exemplifie[d] an 
essentially functional process, indispensable to the idea of manipulating 
icons by a mouse.”188 It further observed that “Apple cannot get patent-
like protection for the idea of a graphical user interface.”189 Numerous 
courts have followed the Microsoft “thin” protection approach to judging 
the scope of software copyrights, in part to ensure that software 
copyrights would not be construed to provide patent-like protection.190
                                                                                                                     
1995) (analogizing the Lotus command hierarchy to the buttons on a VCR), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
184. Microsoft, 799 F. Supp. at 1023. The Ninth Circuit approved of the district court’s 
recognition of “the functional aspects of graphical user interfaces.” Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1442 
n.10.
185. Microsoft, 799 F. Supp. at 1023. Many elements of the Apple GUI had been adopted by 
other software developers. Id. at 1024; see also Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1438 (approving 
standardization as a ground for limiting the scope of copyright in the Apple GUI).
186. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1438.
187. Id. at 1444.
188. Id. Notice the use of both § 102(b) (“process”) and merger (“indispensable”) 
terminology. Id.
189. Id. at 1443. GUI designers face various types of design constraints, including the power 
and speed of the computer, hardware display operations, and ergonomic factors. Id. at 1445.
190. See, e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1012–14 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (applying the virtual identity standard of copyright infringement to a golf game 
interface and concluding that functional features can only be protected by patents); MiTek
Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1558–59 (11th Cir. 1996) (invoking Microsoft
and applying the “virtual identicality” standard to software copyright infringement); see also
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that in view 
of the “highly functional, utilitarian” nature of programs, “it may well be that the Copyright Act 
serves as a relatively weak barrier against public access to the theoretical interstices behind a 
program’s source and object codes”). By directing courts to filter out an extensive list of program 
elements before comparing the works at issue to determine if infringement occurred, Altai, 982 
F.2d at 706–11, Altai was a precursor to the thin protection approach to software copyrights 
endorsed in Microsoft.
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4. The Merger Approach
A more distinctive judicial strategy for managing copyright and patent 
boundaries in software relies on the merger doctrine.191 When an idea or 
function can, as a practical matter, be expressed in only a very limited 
number of ways, copyright protection should be withheld from the 
merged idea/function and its expression.192 The CAFC’s Atari decision 
was the first appellate court opinion to acknowledge the potential 
applicability of a process/expression merger doctrine in software cases.193
The CAFC concluded that “if the patentable process [in a program] and 
its expression are indistinguishable or inextricably intertwined, then ‘the 
process merges with the expression and precludes copyright 
protection.’”194 Had Atari copied only so much of the Nintendo data 
stream as was necessary to achieve compatibility with the then-current 
version of the Nintendo platform, the CAFC would have ruled in Atari’s 
favor on merger grounds.195 However, because Atari copied more than 
was necessary, its merger defense failed.196 Atari would have left the role 
of protecting such a process to patent law.
Atari’s process/expression merger doctrine was influential in Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.197 This lawsuit 
challenged Static’s copying of a small program installed in Lexmark 
cartridges so that Static’s chip customers could make their printer 
                                                                                                                     
191. Courts often trace the merger doctrine to Baker. See, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 
970 F.2d 1067, 1076 (2d Cir. 1992).
192. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741–42 (9th Cir. 
1971) (holding that the expression in a jeweled bee pin was inseparable from its idea).
193. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
194. PRG-Schultz Int’l, Inc. v. Kirix Corp., No. 03C1867, 2003 WL 22232771, at *4 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 22, 2003) (quoting Atari, 975 F.2d at 839–40). Other software cases have recognized 
this type of merger as well. See, e.g., id. (auditing program expression merged with a process);
see also CONTU REPORT, supra note 47, at 50 (“[W]hen specific instructions, even though 
previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later 
use by another will not amount to an infringement.” (emphasis added)). The merger approach has 
also been used to manage copyright/patent boundaries in non-software cases. See Samuelson, 
supra note 2, at 1524–28.
195. Atari, 975 F.2d at 839–40; see also Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 925 F. 
Supp. 1042, 1048–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that process and expression for some nonliteral 
elements of software had merged); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., No. C-84-20799-WPG, 1989 WL 
67434, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (noting that Intel’s patented hardware limited NEC’s 
choices in creating microcode).
196. Professor Cohen disagreed: “The ‘surplus’ functions in the 10NES program did not 
become expression by virtue of their surplusage. They were designed to perform particular 
functions at the interface between the console and cartridge . . . .” Cohen, supra note 144, at 1146.
197. 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir. 2004).
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cartridges interoperate with Lexmark printers.198 The Lexmark cartridge 
program performed a digital handshake with the Lexmark printer 
software to authenticate the cartridge so it would work in Lexmark 
printers.199 Lexmark claimed that Static’s copying infringed copyright.
Static defended by challenging the validity of Lexmark’s copyright and 
asserting a fair use defense.200
Static appealed the district court’s issuance of a preliminary 
injunction.201 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
characterized the Lexmark cartridge program as a “lock-out” code which 
“fall[s] on the functional-idea rather than the original-expression side of 
the copyright line.”202 It recognized that many device makers had 
employed similar software security systems to thwart interconnections 
with unlicensed complementary products.203 The court decided that “[t]o 
the extent compatibility requires that a particular code sequence be 
included in the component device to permit its use, the merger and scènes 
à faire doctrines generally preclude the code sequence from obtaining 
copyright protection.”204
The Sixth Circuit invoked Baker and Altai, among other cases, as 
differentiating the roles of copyright and patent in the protection of 
functional works such as software.205 In keeping with Atari, the court 
recognized that patentable processes and program instructions could 
merge, which would preclude copyright protection for the merged 
materials.206
Lexmark’s expert testified that Static could have developed 
compatible software written somewhat differently from Lexmark’s 
code.207 However, the Sixth Circuit decided that, as a practical matter, the 
                                                                                                                     
198. Id. at 529. Lexmark customers could purchase refillable Lexmark cartridges, or, for a 
lower price, non-refillable cartridges subject to a license requirement enforced by installed 
software. Id. at 529–30. Static’s chips undermined this strategy, enabling Lexmark competitors to 
sell their cartridges to Lexmark customers. Id.
199. Id. at 530. The Lexmark Toner Loading Program’s code consisted of a relatively small 
number of commands, which varied somewhat for each printer. Id. at 529–30. The printer-side 
software was more substantial. Id.
200. Id. at 530–32. Lexmark also claimed that Static violated the anti-circumvention rules, 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (2012), because Static’s chips bypassed the software security 
code embedded in Lexmark’s printers and cartridges. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546–50. The Sixth 
Circuit rejected this claim. Id.
201. Id. at 529.
202. Id. at 536.
203. Id.
204. Id. The court cited approvingly to Accolade and Atari. Id.
205. Id. at 534–35.
206. Id. at 535.
207. Id. at 539.
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expressive choices available to Static were very limited.208 It 
consequently ruled that insofar as the Lexmark code was necessary to 
enable non-Lexmark cartridges to work in Lexmark printers, Static’s 
copying of that code did not infringe.209 The main justification that stands 
out in Lexmark is the merger rationale.210 In the background, though, as 
in Atari, was a concern that copyright protection for programs not be 
interpreted to give patent-like protection to functional aspects of 
programs.
5. The Explanation/Use Distinction Approach
The explanation/use distinction, like several other doctrines of U.S. 
copyright law,211 traces back to the Supreme Court’s Baker decision. The 
Court cryptically stated that:
The description of the [useful] art in a book, though entitled 
to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an 
exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is 
explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may 
be secured by copyright. The latter can be secured, if it can 
be secured at all, by letters-patent.212
The explanation/use distinction was significant in Baker because 
Selden’s widow had announced her intent to sue Baker’s customers for 
using the allegedly infringing forms to keep their books once she 
prevailed in her lawsuit against Baker.213 Had Selden obtained the patent 
he once sought, that patent would have given him an exclusive right to 
control uses of that system, not just making and selling forms embodying 
his invention.214
                                                                                                                     
208. Id. at 539–41 (explaining that efficiency and functionality precluded material changes 
to the Lexmark code and that proposed alternatives were trivial and inefficient, not expressive).
209. Id. at 542–44.
210. Id. at 542 (“[I]f any single byte of the Toner Loading Program is altered, the printer will 
not function.”); see also id. at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring) (stating that the Lexmark Toner 
Loading Program is uncopyrightable under the merger and scènes à faire doctrines).
211. At least eight major doctrines of U.S. copyright law owe their origins to Baker. See
Samuelson, supra note 22, at 180–92.
212. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879); see Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1529–31 
(discussing the Office’s refusal to register a claim in a DNA sequence because its elements were 
selected and arranged to produce a functional result in a biological organism, not for expressive 
purposes).
213. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 167–68.
214. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Baker’s forms were somewhat different from Selden’s forms 
and an improvement over them. See Samuelson, supra note 22, at 161–62, 193 (stating that the 
principal difference between the forms was in how they treated accounts as well as how Baker’s 
forms had several key advantages over Selden’s, such as their ease of use). Hence, Baker’s forms 
might not have infringed a Selden patent on his system.
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The explanation/use distinction has occasionally played a role in the 
subsequent caselaw.215 It largely fell out of favor after Mazer’s 
infelicitous reliance on it in his challenge to Stein’s copyright in a 
statuette intended for use as the base of Stein’s lamps.216 Because Baker
recognized the viability of copyrights in aesthetic creations as well as in 
explanatory works,217 Mazer’s reliance on Baker’s explanation/use 
distinction was an especially weak part of his argument. Treatise author 
Melville B. Nimmer’s longstanding criticism of this distinction may 
explain why it has had relatively little currency until quite recently.218
The First Circuit’s Borland decision invoked this distinction when 
deciding that the Lotus 1-2-3 command hierarchy was an uncopyrightable 
method of operation.219 A “means by which a person operates something, 
whether it be a car, a food processor, or a computer” was within the 
§ 102(b) exclusion.220 A description of such a method would not confer 
exclusive rights over “the method of operation itself.”221 And “[i]f 
specific words are essential to operating something, then they are part of 
a ‘method of operation’ and, as such, are unprotectable.”222 In Borland, 
Lotus had chosen the command words and structured them not for 
explanatory purposes, but rather as a means for accomplishing functional 
tasks: “[U]sers operate Lotus 1-2-3 by using the Lotus menu command 
hierarchy” because “the entire Lotus menu command hierarchy is 
essential to operating Lotus 1-2-3.”223
                                                                                                                     
215. The Seventh Circuit invoked the distinction in Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost 
Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1943).
216. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 212–17 (1954). That is, Mazer argued that Stein had 
created the statuette intending to use it as the base of a lamp, not as a work of art. See infra text 
accompanying notes 255–58 (discussing Mazer).
217. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103–04 (recognizing a copyright in “ornamental designs, or pictorial 
illustrations addressed to the taste”). The statuette in Mazer was ornamental.
218. NIMMER, supra note 17, § 37.3. Subsequent versions of the Nimmer treatise remained 
critical of the explanation/use distinction. See, e.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[D][1] (2015), reprinted in 11 NIMMER & NIMMER 2018, supra note 
17, app. 67C. However, the recently revised version is more receptive to this doctrine. See 
NIMMER & NIMMER 2018, supra note 17, § 2A.07[D][2][a][ii].
219. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815–16 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by 
an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). For an excellent discussion of Borland, see
generally Weinreb, supra note 14. While concurring with the First Circuit’s ruling, Weinreb found 
its § 102(b) analysis unsatisfactory. Id. at 1207–08.
220. Borland, 49 F.3d at 815.
221. Id. The court was sympathetic to Lotus’ customers who had become accustomed to 
using the Lotus command structure and macro system. Id. at 817–18.
222. Id. at 816.
223. Id. David Hayes contends that courts should differentiate the explanation/use distinction 
and a copying-for-use/copying-for-explanation distinction. He considers the former a subject 
matter eligibility doctrine, while the latter is relevant to infringement analysis (i.e., copying the 
Lotus command hierarchy for use purposes, as Borland did, would not infringe, but copying it for 
37
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The First Circuit quoted Baker on the explanation/use distinction in 
support of its method of operation analysis.224 Judge Michael Boudin’s 
concurrence characterized the Lotus program as “a means for causing 
something to happen; it has a mechanical utility, an instrumental role, in 
accomplishing the world’s work.”225 To enforce Lotus’ copyright against 
Borland would, he said, have “some of the consequences of patent
protection in limiting other people’s ability to perform a task in the most 
efficient manner.”226
The explanation/use distinction has recently garnered renewed 
support from courts and copyright scholars.227 Professor Wendy Gordon,
has criticized the CAFC’s Oracle decision for failing to appreciate the 
utility of the Java API declarations as tools for creating new works of 
authorship.228 Professor Gordon argues that “a copyright owner should 
have no prima facie rights over copying behavior where (1) the goals of 
the copying are ‘use’ (behavior in the realm of utility patent) and (2) the 
copying is done solely for goals unrelated to the expressiveness of the 
plaintiff’s work of authorship.”229
Gordon perceives the explanation/use distinction as “implement[ing] 
the deference that, pursuant to Congressional command and Supreme 
Court precedent, U.S. copyright law must give to patent law.”230 This 
distinction “operates by limiting the scope of the exclusive rights a 
                                                                                                                     
explanatory purposes would more likely infringe). Telephone Interview with David L. Hayes,
Partner, Fenwick & West LLP (Nov. 9, 2017).
224. Borland, 49 F.3d at 816–17 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1879)).
225. Id. at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring).
226. Id.
227. See Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1040–
41 (9th Cir. 2015) (invoking the explanation/use distinction); see also ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER,
WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 13 (2015) (“[In Baker,] [t]he defendant used the forms as a tool 
but not as a work, and was therefore not liable in copyright. . . . Baker thus turns on a crucial 
distinction between the work as a communicative act and its material form as its physical 
embodiment. Use of the physical embodiment for noncommunicative purposes does not give rise 
to liability.”); see also Cohen, supra note 144, at 1145 (discussing interoperability-related routines 
as methods of operation relying on the use/expression distinction).
228. For this criticism, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, How Oracle Erred: The 
Use/Explanation Distinction and the Future of Computer Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN 
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 375 (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017).
229. Id. at 376. The explanation/use distinction resembles the rule that a copyright in a 
drawing of a useful article does not confer copyright protection over the useful article depicted 
therein. See, e.g., Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021, 1021–22 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (holding 
that a copyright in plaintiff’s drawing did not give it exclusive rights to control the manufacture 
of parachutes embodying that design; invoking Baker, such exclusive rights can only be obtained 
through a patent). This rule is now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012).
230. Gordon, supra note 228, at 376; see also McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 30, at 543 
(discussing the notion of patent supremacy over other forms of IP).
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copyright owner might otherwise possess, not by targeting the 
copyrightability of what plaintiff produced.”231
Gordon offers this non-software example to illustrate the distinction:
[I]t is an expressive use when the publisher of a how-to book 
on home repair copies someone else’s copyrighted passage 
explaining how to rewire a lamp instead of writing his own 
instructions. It is a nonexpressive use when a homeowner 
applies the same copyrighted passage to the task of actually 
rewiring lighting fixtures. Copying text to convey an 
explanation or to serve other expressive goals belongs to the 
realm of copyright; copying to build a functional invention 
instead belongs to the realm of patent.232
In Gordon’s view, Google made non-expressive uses of the Java 
method headers to enable programmers trained in the Java programming 
language to create new programs or adapt old ones to run on the Android 
platform.233 The declarations were tools for creating programs because 
they identified particular functions to be performed, just as the Lotus 
command hierarchy provided tools for user-constructed macros.234
Gordon might, although she did not, have added that many books set 
forth the Java API, including many thousands of its declarations, in order 
to explain these functions and how to use the declarations to create 
programs.235 These books arguably publish elements of the Java API for 
explanatory purposes. Oracle has not objected to these uses of the Java 
API, but only Google’s use of them as tools for its Android platform.236
C. The Scope of Software Copyrights in the Post-Altai Caselaw
Each of the judicial strategies for avoiding overlap of copyright and 
patent protections in software has merit within its doctrinal framing. The 
“thin” protection strategy, with its endorsement of filtration of numerous 
categories of software elements and of a virtual identity standard to 
support an infringement finding, may be the surest way for courts to 
                                                                                                                     
231. Gordon, supra note 228, at 376.
232. Id. at 380.
233. Id. at 381–82.
234. Id. at 427. Gordon did not address whether she believed the Java declarations were 
patentable.
235. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016) (mentioning books setting forth and explaining the Java API), 
rev’d, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
236. The command hierarchies in Borland were readily visible to users of the software. The 
command structure of the Java declarations was not visible to users of Android. Programmers 
learn Java commands and their structures by studying the Java Standard Edition text that sets forth 
the Java API or reading books that teach programmers how to use this API. Id.
39
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ensure that copyright is not being used to confer patent-like protection to 
software innovations.237 Yet, courts also averted overlap problems when 
relying on the conception of copyright and patent protecting different 
aspects of programs, on the § 102(b) exclusions, and on the merger 
doctrine. The cases have achieved comparable outcomes while 
contributing to a more refined jurisprudence about copyright-protectable 
and unprotectable structures.
Considering these developments, it can be said with reasonable 
assurance that concerns about the overbroad scope of software copyrights 
expressed in the late 1980s and 1990s subsided considerably once the 
Altai decision garnered progeny. The software copyright caselaw since 
then has generally followed the lead of Altai and its progeny in engaging 
in rigorous filtration of unprotectable elements and focusing infringement 
analysis on software design elements that have some expressive 
character.238
Yet, the software copyright cases since 2000, although generally 
following Altai and other similar cases, rarely mention the potential 
patentability of software innovations when judging copyright 
infringement claims. Perhaps as a consequence, the issue of whether 
copyright and patent can provide overlapping protections or are mutually 
exclusive has rarely surfaced in the post-Altai cases. However, in the few 
cases to which this Article now turns, it has.
                                                                                                                     
237. The Ninth Circuit in Microsoft regarded thin protection as the necessary result of 
applying numerous limiting doctrines to those parts of the Apple GUI claimed to infringe. See 
supra Section II.B.3.
238. Most software copyright cases since Altai have engaged in highly dissective analyses 
of software copyright claims. See, e.g., R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 
275–76 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff failed to 
specify which elements of its credit union processing software were original expressions and to 
filter out unprotectable elements); Real View, LLC v. 20-20 Techs., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 147, 
157, 162 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that screen displays and GUI were not infringed because too 
many elements were unprotectable under § 102(b) and the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire); 
Comput. Access Tech. Corp. v. Catalyst Enters., Inc., No. C-00-4852-DLJ, 2001 WL 34118030, 
at *14–17 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2001) (holding that many aspects of the plaintiff’s GUI were 
unprotectable as industry standards, efficient designs, or as dictated by function; sufficient 
differences in the GUIs precluded the relief that CATC sought).
There have been, however, a few problematic post-Altai cases ruling that the defendants’ use 
of the same methods infringed. See, e.g., Aspen Tech., Inc. v. M3 Tech., Inc., 569 F. App’x 259,
270 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding infringement based on the use of the same steps, parsing methods, 
and power function device in chemical refinery programs); see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google 
Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (opining that copyright protection is available to 
protect program methods). Some courts have extended protection to command languages. See, 
e.g., McEnroe v. Mantissa Corp., No. 14-cv-12320-LTS, 2016 WL 7799636, at *13 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 29, 2016) (holding that a command language was copyrightable).
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III. THE CAFC’S ERRONEOUS ENDORSEMENT OF COPYRIGHT/PATENT 
OVERLAPS IN ORACLE
The CAFC’s Oracle decision is the only precedent to have endorsed 
overlapping copyright and patent protections for nonliteral elements of 
software such as APIs.239 The issue came up in two other cases, but 
appellate courts had different views. Oracle was deeply flawed in its 
treatment of the overlap issue and its endorsement of overlap should be 
given no weight in future cases. Courts should be more receptive to well-
drawn arguments that the patentability of some nonliteral elements of 
programs is evidence that copyright protection should be withheld.
A. Reversals of Copyright/Patent Overlap-Approving Decisions in
Software Cases
Except for Oracle, courts have generally been unreceptive to 
arguments that copyright and patent can provide overlapping protections 
for the same aspects of software. Two lower court decisions accepting 
this possibility were reversed on appeal.
One was the district court decision in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando 
America, Inc.240 Bando argued that its use of some of the same algorithms 
as the Gates program was non-infringing because algorithms were patent, 
not copyright, subject matter.241 The trial court rejected this argument, 
saying that “[s]uch a holding would tend to fragment further the rather 
tenuous continuity found in copyright law concerning computer 
programs.”242
The Tenth Circuit reversed, stating that program processes, such as 
algorithms, were unprotectable by copyright law under § 102(b), even 
                                                                                                                     
239. Two litigants unsuccessfully argued that computer programs were uncopyrightable 
because they were patentable. See Aharonian v. Gonzales, No. C 04-5190 MHP, 2006 WL 13067, 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006) (denying a declaratory judgment that computer programs could not 
be copyrighted because they consisted of patentable algorithms and data structures); Apple 
Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 8125  (E.D. Pa. 1982) (denying a 
motion for a preliminary injunction because copyright law only protects communicative 
authorship, not utilitarian works such as software, the latter being protectable only by patents), 
rev’d, 714 F.2d 1240, 1250–53 (3d Cir. 1983) (ordering a preliminary injunction because the exact 
copying of Apple operating system programs was copyright infringement). 
240. 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus. Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993). Gates’ program enabled its sales 
staff to input certain variables and perform calculations needed to assess which of Gates’ 
industrial belts would work best for customers’ machines. Id. at 1503. Bando developed a program 
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though they might be eligible for patenting.243 It recognized that 
programs designed to perform complex calculations would necessarily 
embody numerous methods and processes that copyright could not 
protect.244 The exclusion of processes from the scope of copyright in 
software was “one of the most important” of the utilitarian elements 
Congress meant to make unprotectable by copyright.245 The court quoted 
from the legislative history:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer 
programs should extend protection to the methodology or 
processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to 
the “writing” expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is 
intended, among other things, to make clear that the 
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable 
element in a computer program, and that the actual processes 
or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope 
of the copyright law.246
Consistent with Altai, the Tenth Circuit in Gates recognized that such 
processes should be filtered out before assessing the infringement 
claim.247
A second copyright/patent overlap-approving decision was the district 
court’s first opinion in Borland.248 The court observed that “[t]he mere 
fact that patent law allows a means of legal protection for a 
process . . . does not establish that there is not also some protection in 
copyright . . . .”249 In its view, copyright and patent provided rights that 
were perhaps “not coextensive, but it is equally clear that there is no 
particular reason to believe there should never be any area of overlap.”250
The court cited to the copyright/(design)patent overlap-endorsing dicta in 
                                                                                                                     
243. See Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 836–37. The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the exclusivity 
of copyright and patent protections in protecting software innovations. Id.
244. Id. at 830, 836. The district court’s infringement ruling was based on similarities in 
mathematical constants, algorithms, menus, sorting criteria, fundamental tasks, install files, and 
overall data and control flows. Id. at 842.
245. Id. at 836.
246. Id. at 836–37 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976)). This is the language from 
the legislative history that the Oracle decision neglected to cite. See infra note 269.
247. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d. at 842, 845. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for 
clarification of Gates’ copyright claims based on similarities in menus, sorting criteria, data flow 
and control flow. Id. at 844–46.
248. For this decision, see generally Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc. 788 F. Supp. 78 
(D. Mass. 1992), rev’d, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
249. Id. at 91.
250. Id.
42
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Mazer, asserting that this “precedent recognizes some overlap.”251 It 
perceived no reason why patent and copyright protection could not be 
available for such things as program command structures.252
Although the First Circuit did not explicitly repudiate the district 
court’s dicta on copyright/patent overlaps, it held that Borland’s copying 
of the Lotus command hierarchy did not infringe copyright.253 In view of 
its invocation of § 102(b)’s method of operation exclusion, that court’s 
decision is more consistent with the many other precedents that have 
sought to maintain separate domains for copyright and patent in the 
protection of program innovations than with the district court’s overlap 
endorsement.254
B. The CAFC’s Flawed Acceptance of a Software Copyright/Patent 
Overlap in Oracle
To support its view that copyright and patent could provide 
overlapping protections for software APIs, the Oracle court invoked the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of an IP exclusivity argument in Mazer v. 
Stein.255 Mazer had argued that Stein’s claim of copyright in a statuette 
of a Balinese dancer was invalid because Stein should have obtained a 
design patent for exclusive rights to manufacture the statuette as an 
ornamental design for an article of manufacture (that is, as the base of a 
lamp).256 Under Mazer’s conception of Baker, the unpatented lamp base 
design was in the public domain and available for unrestricted copying.257
The Court disagreed, observing that “[n]either the Copyright Statute nor 
any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be 
copyrighted.”258 This is the dictum with which the CAFC fended off 
Google’s mutual exclusivity argument in Oracle.259 This was the only 
judicial precedent to which the CAFC adverted in that part of its 
opinion.260
The CAFC did not address Google’s patent-not-copyright-subject-
matter defense until the very end of its opinion, characterizing it as a 
                                                                                                                     
251. Id. (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)); see infra text accompanying notes 
266–68 (explaining why Mazer does not support the district court’s assertion).
252. Borland, 788 F. Supp. at 91. The court did not opine whether it thought the Lotus 
command structure and macro system were both patentable and copyrightable.
253. Borland, 49 F.3d at 818; see supra text accompanying note 228.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 153–56, 219–26 (discussing Borland).
255. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217).
256. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215–16.
257. Id. at 217.
258. Id.
259. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1380.
260. See id. at 1377–81.
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“policy-based argument” that attacked the very existence of copyright 
protection for programs, as if Google was claiming that only patents 
could protect program innovations.261 Until Congress or the Supreme 
Court repudiated software copyrights, the CAFC felt dutybound to
uphold the copyrightability of software.262
The CAFC’s response to Google’s exclusivity argument is 
unpersuasive for at least four reasons. First, the court misconstrued 
Google’s argument. Google was not contending that original programs 
could not be protected by copyright law and were only protectable by 
patent law.263 Such an argument would have been specious, and as a 
major developer of software itself, Google had every reason to want 
original software to be copyrightable. Rather, Google’s argument was 
that the scope of the valid copyright in the Java Standard Edition 
document, which sets forth elements of the Java API, did not extend to 
the declarations it used in Android because they were the names of 
functions that programmers needed to use to write programs in Java.264
Second and most significantly, the CAFC failed to recognize that the 
Supreme Court in Mazer actually supported Google’s exclusivity 
defense. The dictum quoted by the CAFC arose in the context of a real, 
albeit partial, overlap in the subject matters protectable by copyright and 
design patent law.265 Stein’s statuette in Mazer qualified as a work of art 
under U.S. copyright law, although when used as the base of a lamp, the 
statuette was also eligible for design patent protection as an ornamental
design of an article of manufacture.266 The CAFC overlooked the 
unequivocal statement in Mazer that “the Mechanical Patent Law and 
Copyright Laws are mutually exclusive,”267 as well as Mazer’s approving 
citation to Taylor and three other Baker progeny, all of which upheld 
exclusivity of copyright and patent protections.268
                                                                                                                     
261. See id. at 1379–81. The CAFC seemingly thought that Google was making the same 
flawed arguments as Franklin and Aharonian had done in earlier cases. See supra text 
accompanying note 239.
262. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1381.
263. See Brief of Appellee & Cross-Appellant Google Inc. at 29–33, Oracle, 750 F.3d 1339 
(Nos. 2013-1021, -1022) [hereinafter Google Brief].
264. Id. at 15. Google relied more heavily on its § 102(b) defense than the copyright/patent 
exclusivity defense. Id. at 31–40, 57–65.
265. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1380.
266. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215–17 (1954). Well before Mazer, the Court had 
recognized that design patents and copyrights had overlapping subject matters. See, e.g., DeJonge 
& Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33, 36 (1914) (noting the lower court’s opinion that a 
pictorial design was eligible for copyright and a design patent).
267. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215 n.33 (emphasis added).
268. See id. at 217 n.39 (citing additional Baker progeny); see also NIMMER & NIMMER 2018,
supra note 17, § 2A.07[D][4] (characterizing the CAFC’s Oracle opinion as a “misconstru[al of] 
Mazer”).
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Third, the CAFC’s recitation of the legislative history of § 102(b) 
omitted reference to the most relevant part, which expressed the intent 
for § 102(b) to limit the scope of software copyrights: “[s]ection 102(b) 
is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted 
by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, 
and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not 
within the scope of the copyright law.”269 This was supposed to allay 
concerns that software copyrights would be construed to extend 
protections to methods and processes. By its earlier statements endorsing 
copyright protection for methods,270 the CAFC’s decision is directly 
contrary to the text of § 102(b) and the pro-competitive policies it was 
intended to embody.
Fourth, the CAFC ignored that its endorsement of the copyright/patent 
overlap in Oracle was inconsistent with several appellate court decisions 
in software IP cases,271 including its Atari decision, which averred that 
“patent and copyright laws protect distinct aspects of a computer 
program.”272 Although the Oracle court cited approvingly to that 
decision,273 it did not explain why it was deviating from its previous 
“distinct aspects” perspective.
The overwhelming majority of scholarly commentary on the CAFC’s 
Oracle decision has, moreover, strongly criticized it,274 including its 
                                                                                                                     
269. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976).
270. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1356–57.
271. See supra Section II.B. The Ninth Circuit interpretation of § 102(b) in Bikram’s Yoga
Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015), further undermines 
the Oracle decision. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Elec. Frontier Found. in Support of 
Defendant-Appellee at 4–6, Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Arista Networks, Inc., No. 2017-2145 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 26, 2017) (explaining why Bikram Yoga calls into question the copyrightability analysis in 
Oracle).
272. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879)); see also Hutchins v. Zoll 
Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)) (upholding a trial court ruling against plaintiff’s copyright claim on 
the ground that the technological process embodied in the defendant’s program was not 
protectable expression).
273. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1357.
274. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 17, at 154–55; Clark D. Asay, Copyright’s 
Technological Interdependencies, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 189, 235 (2015); Gordon, supra note 
228, at 326, 329–30; Joseph Gratz & Mark A. Lemley, Platforms and Interoperability in Oracle 
v. Google, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 603, 605–06 (2018); Sean Hogle, Software Copyright and 
Innovation after Oracle v. Google, 40 NEW MATTER 1, 2 (2015); Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API 
Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional 
Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 307 (2018); Samuelson, supra note 
8, at 1256; Pamela Samuelson, Three Fundamental Flaws in CAFC’s Oracle v. Google Decision,
37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 702, 702–08 (2015); Fred von Lohmann, The New Wave: Copyright 
and Software Interfaces in the Wake of Oracle v. Google, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 517, 519 (2018);
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endorsement of overlapping copyright and patent protection for software 
innovations.275 Although the Nimmer treatise once offered some support 
for Oracle’s copyright/patent overlap ruling, the latest version of the 
treatise now criticizes this aspect of the CAFC’s ruling.276
The weaknesses of the CAFC Oracle decision’s treatment of the 
copyright/patent overlap issue and the Mazer-Baker exclusivity 
statements notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has sometimes been 
unreceptive to categorical exclusivity arguments in IP cases.277 Some IP
scholars and lawyers, moreover, have hesitated to endorse a categorical 
exclusivity approach to managing the copyright/patent boundary as to 
software innovations.278 Although many strongly support exclusivity and 
regard the patentability of nonliteral elements of software as a reason to 
construe copyright as providing a narrow scope of protection,279 others 
view copyright and patent as providing software developers with a choice 
about which type of IP protection to pursue as a business strategy.280
                                                                                                                     
Jonathan Band, The Protectability of Application Program Interfaces: Oracle America v. Google 
1–2 (Aug. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract
_id=2186628 [https://perma.cc/QYJ8-BGNZ]. But see Jonathan Ambrose, Oracle America, Inc. 
v. Google, Inc.: The Only Nonliteral Aspects of Java APIs Protected Under Copyright Law Are 
the Ones Nobody Wants to Copy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 5 (2012) (endorsing the district 
court’s copyrightability ruling).
275. See Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1289–91.
276. Compare NIMMER & NIMMER 2017, supra note 17, § 2A.07[A], with NIMMER &
NIMMER 2018, supra note 17, § 2A.07[D][4]. The Goldstein treatise obliquely criticizes the 
CAFC’s Oracle decision. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.15.2.1, at 2:198 
n.87.1 (3d ed. 2005 & 2015 Supp.) (stating that CAFC in Oracle “purportedly” followed Ninth 
Circuit precedents).
277. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001) 
(rejecting the argument that novel plants were unpatentable because Congress intended for them 
to be protected only under the Plant Variety Protection Act); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001) (declining to address whether a product configuration 
would be categorically ineligible for trade dress protection if patented); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 217 (1954) (rejecting the argument that a lamp base statuette could be protected only by 
design patent law). The Court was unconvinced by Borland’s categorical exclusivity argument as 
well. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996) (affirming the First 
Circuit’s ruling by a 4-4 vote). Borland’s brief to the Supreme Court relied heavily on its 
categorical exclusivity argument. See Borland Brief, supra note 155, at 22–44.
278. See Chisum et al., supra note 18, at 17–18 (stating that there is no consensus among IP 
scholars regarding whether the patentability of program innovations is relevant to the scope of 
copyright protection for SSO). See generally Samuelson, supra note 18 (reporting on a survey of 
IP lawyers about copyright and patent protection for specific aspects of programs).
279. See, e.g., Karjala, Relative Roles, supra note 17, at 49–50; Lundberg et al., supra note 
16, at 252; see also supra note 17 (listing more sources that take this view).
280. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 107, at 95 (testimony of Pamela Samuelson) 
(reporting that IP lawyers would characterize nonliteral software structures as methods when they 
wanted to patent them and as SSO when asserting copyright); Samuelson, supra note 18, at 270–
71.
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That being said, no court has ever actually held that any nonliteral 
element of software was both copyright and patent protectable.281 Nor has 
any judicial opinion endorsed the notion that software developers could 
claim copyright protection for nonliteral elements of software for which 
utility patents could have issued but had not been obtained, or as to which 
a utility patent had issued, but then expired. Nor has any commentator 
forthrightly asserted that copyright should serve as a gap-filler for 
software designs that fall within the patent domain, but whose creator 
failed either to seek or to get a patent.
Yet, the potential for copyright and patent to provide overlapping or 
substitutive protection for program innovations is real, in no small part 
due to the lack of clarity in both the copyright and patent caselaw about 
exactly which elements of software fall within the scope of each law.282
As Judge Boudin observed in Borland, some aspects of programs, such 
as user interface command structures that are visible to users, “look 
hauntingly like the familiar stuff of copyright,” although “the ‘substance’ 
probably has more to do with problems presented in patent law.”283 There 
may, however, be a more nuanced way to raise exclusivity defenses in 
software copyright cases.
C. The Taking-Patents-Into-Account Approach
Google may have made a strategic mistake when raising its 
copyright/patent exclusivity defense. Instead of arguing that the existence 
of some patents on command structures or APIs was dispositive evidence 
that these types of nonliteral elements of software were patent and not 
copyright subject matter, Google should have argued that such patents 
are strong evidence that command structures or APIs were unprotectable 
under § 102(b).284 This kind of taking-patents-into-account approach285
                                                                                                                     
281. Nor has any court ever upheld overlapping copyright and patent protection for the same 
aspects of non-software creations. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1537.
282. See, e.g., McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 30, at 543–44 (expressing concern about 
the indistinctness of patent subject matter boundaries as an impediment to effective channeling 
rules for other IP regimes). Part IV of the McKenna and Sprigman article discusses how the 
copyright/patent boundary ambiguity might be reduced. Id. at 540–45.
283. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., 
concurring), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
284. The PTO might have issued those patents in error. Or the patents may have been granted 
at a different level of abstraction than the command structures or APIs at issue in the Borland and 
Oracle cases.
285. This taking-patents-into-account has been a viable strategy in some non-software 
copyright cases. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1531–33.
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is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,286 as well as with Baker287 and Taylor.288
TrafFix is, of course, a trade dress, not a copyright, case, but the 
principle enunciated in that case has application beyond the trade dress 
domain.289 The Court in TrafFix did not regard the existence of an expired 
patent as conclusive evidence that the design could not be protected as 
trade dress.290 But an expired patent’s description of a design’s 
functionality, such as MDI’s dual-spring design for roadside signs, was 
strong evidence that the design was too functional to be protectable trade 
dress.291 Because functionality can disqualify designs from copyright as 
well as trade dress protections,292 courts should examine software-related 
patents for descriptions of the patented design’s functional advantages
that may disqualify it from copyright protection.293
The exclusivity argument in TrafFix was particularly strong because 
MDI had actually patented the very same dual-spring design in which it 
was claiming trade dress rights.294 That design’s functionality was plainly 
described in that patent, and the patent had expired.295 It took some 
chutzpah for MDI to contend that this dual-spring design was non-
functional in hopes of extending MDI’s exclusive control over the 
design.296 Allowing MDI to claim trade dress protection would defeat the 
well-established patent policy that when a patent has expired, the design 
is in the public domain and available for unrestricted copying.297
                                                                                                                     
286. 532 U.S. 23, 30–31 (2001).
287. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1880) (commenting that useful arts that could 
not be protected by copyright might be protected by patent).
288. Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 99–101 (7th Cir. 1943) 
(concluding that there is no overlap between copyright and patent protection and observing that 
though material is no longer patented, it cannot be protected by copyright).
289. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 
652–56 (2014); Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1292.
290. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.
291. Id. at 29–30.
292. See, e.g., Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) 
(holding that a cabinet for a dialysis center was too utilitarian to be protectable by copyright law).
293. See, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding 
the denial of copyright registration to a patented KOOSH ball on the grounds that it was a useful 
article that lacked separable expression). OddzOn is discussed in Samuelson, supra note 2, at 
1524–26.
294. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29–30. The Solicitor General supported TrafFix’s appeal. Id. at 25.
John G. Roberts, Jr., now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was TrafFix’s lawyer. Id.
295. Id. at 25–26.
296. The Sixth Circuit held that MDI’s design was eligible for trade dress protection because 
it was not dictated by function. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 942 
(6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
297. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(holding that Florida’s anti-plug mold statute was preempted by federal patent policy).
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The Oracle298 case presented less compelling facts for a 
copyright/patent exclusivity defense than did TrafFix.299 In Oracle, the 
district court mentioned patents on program interfaces, including some 
owned by Oracle, as suggestive that APIs were patent, not copyright 
subject matter.300 But the court did not closely analyze those patents or 
compare their claims with the Java API declarations in which Oracle 
claimed copyright.
While the taking-patents-into-account approach has not yet 
succeeded, that does not mean that the approach can never be successful. 
When raised in the future, it should be applied with more analytic rigor 
and attention to detail. With the right set of facts (for instance, a patent 
on a data structure that described its functional advantages over the state 
of the prior art), this approach may meet with more success when a 
copyright claim is made for the same or a very similar software design 
feature.301 Because tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of patents have
been issued for nonliteral elements of programs in the past three 
decades,302 the risk of copyright/patent overlaps as to nonliteral elements 
of software is far from hypothetical.
IV. RESTORING RIGOROUS FILTRATION TO AVOID CONFERRING PATENT-
LIKE PROTECTION TO SOFTWARE THROUGH COPYRIGHT LAW
For more than two decades after Altai, the state of software IP law was 
quite stable in both the copyright and patent domains. Copyright 
protection for software was understood to be “thin” because courts 
recognized that programs embodied a relatively high quantum of 
unprotectable elements that had to be filtered out before assessing 
                                                                                                                     
298. 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
299. The exclusivity defense was also weak in Franklin. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin 
Comput. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev’d, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). The 
district court characterized a ROM chip as firmware, id. at 824, when the ROM was merely a 
medium in which the Apple programs were stored. Id. at 819–20. It cited Diamond v. Bradley,
450 U.S. 381 (1981), as having upheld the patentability of firmware. Franklin, 545 F. Supp. at 
824. However, Bradley merely affirmed the patentability of a data structure (and then only by an 
equally divided vote). 450 U.S. at 381.
300. Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
301. Software patent cases, by contrast, almost never refer to software copyrights. A rare 
exception was the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) 
(quoting from a Presidential Commission report opposing patent protection for software in part 
because of the availability of copyright protection). See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying 
text.
302. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 17, at 159–60 (reporting the issuance of 16,000 
software patents in 2004, 25,000 in 2009, and nearly 55,000 in 2014).
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copyright infringement claims, and patents were understood to be readily 
available for a wide array of software methods and systems.303
In 2014, two important developments—one on the copyright side and 
one on the patent side—upset this equilibrium. The copyright-side 
development was the CAFC’s Oracle decision, which upheld a claim of 
copyright in parts of the Java API.304 Although purporting to follow 
Altai,305 Oracle was much closer to Whelan in its conception of 
copyright’s scope.306 It construed § 102(b) as excluding from copyright’s 
scope only abstract ideas and merged elements; it endorsed copyright 
protection for program methods; it upheld the copyrightability of the Java 
API because Sun/Oracle had made creative choices in designing it; and it 
accepted copyright/patent overlaps for nonliteral elements of software, 
such as APIs and command structures.307 Like Whelan before it, the 
overbroad software copyright ruling in Oracle has emboldened several 
incumbent firms to initiate similar SSO lawsuits against upstart 
developers of compatible products.308 There is a risk that courts after 
Oracle will, even if inadvertently, extend patent-like protection to 
software through copyright law. Because software developers can easily 
add a patent claim to their copyright complaints, they can take advantage 
of the CAFC’s exclusive jurisdiction, even if the patent claim falls out of 
the case at an early stage.
The patent-side development was the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,309 which struck down a patent for 
a software-implemented method and system of settling financial 
transaction risks. Alice significantly limited the extent to which software 
                                                                                                                     
303. See generally Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1243 (“[T]he scope of copyright protection 
in computer programs is generally much thinner than the scope of copyright in conventional 
literary works . . . because programs embody many functional design elements that lie outside the 
scope of copyright protection under § 102(b).”).
304. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
305. Id. at 1355–58.
306. Oracle gave a very narrow interpretation to § 102(b) exclusions, even opining that 
program methods might be copyrightable. Id. at 1356–57. The similarity between Whelan and 
Oracle is discussed in Armstrong, supra note 17, at 152–56, and Samuelson, supra note 8, at 
1222, 1237–67.
307. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1359–72, 1379–81. The CAFC takes a comparably narrow view of 
functionality as a disqualifier from design patent protection. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. 
v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (commenting that determining 
whether a design is primarily functional or ornamental requires looking at the design as a whole). 
Only if a design is dictated by function does the CAFC consider it to be too functional to be 
eligible for patenting. Id.
308. See generally von Lohmann, supra note 274, at 519–27 (discussing cases since Oracle).
309. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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innovations can qualify for patenting.310 By re-endorsing Benson and
Flook, and emphasizing the abstractness of many software 
innovations,311 the Court cast a new shadow on the tens of thousands of 
software patents issued in the heyday of the Alappat and State Street 
everything-under-the-sun-is-patentable decisions. Indeed, many software 
patents have been invalidated since Alice.312
A. Oracle and Alice Have Created Perverse Incentives for Developers 
to Use Copyright to Get Patent-Like Protection for
Nonliteral Elements of Programs
Even before Oracle and Alice, there were several reasons why it was 
tempting for software developers to assert copyright protection for 
nonliteral elements of programs that were functional enough to be 
patentable, but that remained unpatented. Copyright has several
advantages over patents for nonliteral elements of software. First, 
copyright provides automatic protection, rendering unnecessary the high 
expenditures of time, money, and effort required to obtain patent 
protection.313 Second, copyright requires only a modest amount of 
originality to qualify for protection, not novelty and nonobviousness, as 
patent does; and the Copyright Office examination is much less rigorous 
than the PTO’s.314 Third, with copyright, protection lasts much longer 
and is much less vulnerable to invalidation than with patents.315 Fourth, 
copyright law does not require disclosure of one’s creation or specific 
claiming to acquire the right as patent law does.316 An SSO copyright 
claim would bypass patent law’s disclosure and claiming requirements. 
Fifth, the copyright standard for infringement, which assesses the 
substantial similarity in expression (which courts may not require 
plaintiffs to define) of the works at issue, is much less precise and 
demanding than the element-by-element analysis of patent infringement 
                                                                                                                     
310. Alice may alleviate concerns about non-practicing entities (often known as “patent 
trolls”), who, after buying software patents, often from failed startups, make demands for high 
licensing fees that some consider extortionate or bring lawsuits for patent infringement. See, e.g., 
James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis Is Really a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-
is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/A9MA-92RA] (discussing rise in software 
patent litigation). See generally Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 461 (2014) (studying the distributional impacts of the demands of patent trolls).
311. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226–27 (2014) (discussing the Court’s other recent patent subject 
matter cases, as well as Benson and Flook).
312. See, e.g., Tran, supra note 138, at 533–34.
313. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1497.
314. Id. at 1497–99.
315. Id. at 1497.
316. Id. at 1498.
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claims.317 Sixth, copyright remedies are more attractive for plaintiffs than 
patent remedies.318 Disgorgement of a defendant’s profits is recoverable 
in copyright, along with any lost profits (such as a license fee).319 Patent 
law does not allow profit disgorgement at all, and because lost profits 
from infringement of a patent on a component of a larger manufacture 
may be difficult to prove, reasonable royalties are the most common 
patent infringement remedy.320
After Alice, many nonliteral elements of programs may be too abstract 
to qualify for patent protection. A copyright SSO claim may be plausible, 
though, as long as there is more than one way to structure those 
elements.321 After Alice, issued patents on program SSO may be of 
questionable validity, so shifting one’s claim to copyright as SSO would 
be a way to obtain exclusive rights. After all, every method or system that 
was patent subject matter under State Street would have some structure 
that could be renamed program SSO.322 Software developers generally 
prefer to treat internal SSO as trade secrets instead of seeking patents.323
But if competitors somehow manage to get access to that SSO, developers 
may well assert SSO copyright claims to stop its use in competing 
products. The temptation to assert copyright to fill in gaps in IP 
protections for software exists and is strong.324
Oracle provides strong incentives for software copyright plaintiffs to 
add a patent claim to their copyright complaints, for even if the patent 
claim is dismissed at an early stage of the case, any appeal of the 
copyright ruling will go to the CAFC, not to the regional circuits that 
would ordinarily hear appeals in copyright cases. Unless the Supreme 
Court decides to hear Google’s latest appeal, the CAFC’s Oracle decision 
may well enable aggressive software copyright plaintiffs to avoid 
application of the rigorous filtration tests previously adopted in Altai and 
                                                                                                                     
317. Id. at 1498–99. 
318. Id. at 1499.
319. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)–(b) (2012).
320. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
321. Proponents of broad software copyrights tend to ignore the role that patents play in the 
protection of software innovations. See, e.g., Clapes et al., supra note 14, at 1558–60.
322. See, e.g., Karjala, Relative Roles, supra note 17, at 66–68 (arguing that program SSO is 
patentable); Lemley, supra note 17 (asserting that the nonliteral elements of programs are 
patentable); John P. Sumner, The Copyright/Patent Interface: Patent Protection for the Structure 
of Program Code, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 107, 113–14 (1989) (stating that program SSO is patentable).
323. See generally David W. Carstens, Legal Protection of Computer Software: Patents, 
Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 13 (1994) (discussing different forms of IP 
protection for software).
324. On December 14, 2016, at a Copyright Society of the U.S.A. debate in San Francisco 
on the Oracle v. Google case, Annette Hurst, who represented Oracle in that case, stated that IP 
lawyers are talking about the need for copyright to expand to make up for the lessened availability 
of patents. This is a bad idea. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 25–26 (arguing against expansive 
interpretations of copyright to fill gap if patents are unavailable).
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its progeny, as well as to get exclusive rights in unpatentable methods and 
processes by claiming them as SSO.
But let us imagine what the future for software copyright law could 
look like if the Court does take Google’s appeal and decides that Altai
and its progeny were right: that copyright law should not be construed to 
confer patent-like protection to programs, that § 102(b)’s exclusions of 
methods and processes should be respected, and that it is for patent law 
to protect program functionality.
B. How to Minimize the Potential Misuse of Copyright to Confer 
Patent-Like Protections for Nonliteral Elements of Software
The first step toward minimizing the potential misuse of software 
copyright law is recognizing the risks to competition and innovation if 
the Oracle decision, in effect, resurrects Whelan and the patent-like 
protections it would enable simply by characterizing nonliteral elements 
as program SSO. The second step is for courts to do a better job of
conceptualizing copyright protectable and unprotectable aspects of 
programs in keeping with the long-standing fundamental principle that 
copyright law should not provide patent-like protections to software or 
other functional innovations embodied in copyrighted works.
Over the past several decades, the only easily resolved software 
copyright cases have been those in which plaintiffs proved that 
defendants literally infringed source or object code or copied videogame 
audiovisuals or other expressive screen displays generated by 
programs.325 Copyright provides very meaningful protection to these 
elements of programs. Thus, the resolution of these types of infringement 
claims has generated little or no controversy.
Nonliteral infringement claims have proven much more difficult for 
courts to resolve for several reasons. First, judges and juries typically lack 
the technical training necessary to comprehend programs’ complex 
technological character.326 Second, software is not a “literary work” in 
either the conventional sense of the term (for example, a novel) or the 
conventional copyright sense of the term (for example, a compilation of 
                                                                                                                     
325. See e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(involving source code copying); Engenium Sols., Inc. v. Symphonic Techs., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 
2d 757, 778–80 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (involving verbatim copying of code); Spry Fox LLC v. 
LOLApps Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00147-RAJ, 2012 WL 5290158, at *1, *8 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 
2012) (stating that there were enough similarities in videogame graphics to deny a defense motion 
to dismiss). Software copyrights might also be infringed by some nonliteral copying, as when a 
competitor recompiles another’s code, directly translates the program from one programming 
language to another, or makes minor alterations (e.g., changing variable names) to disguise 
infringement.
326. See, e.g., Nimmer et al., supra note 98, at 625–26.
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data). It is a virtual machine that happens to have been constructed in 
text.327 Copyright doctrines developed to assess infringement of novels 
and dramatic plays are ill-suited to informing judgments about software 
nonliteral infringements.328 Third, while it is easy to say that copyright 
law protects only program expression and not program function, 
separating expression and function has, in practice, been maddeningly 
difficult.329 Functional considerations pervade the design of virtually 
every aspect of software. Finally, courts have been surprisingly reluctant 
to construe and apply the § 102(b) method exclusions in software 
copyright cases or to recognize that the design of software largely lies in 
assembling functional compilations of applied knowhow.330
There are sound ways to address each of these problems. The Federal 
Judicial Center has organized training sessions to teach judges about 
software, other advanced technologies, and IP law.331 Judges with 
experience in technology cases are now more frequently assigned to hear 
them.332 Additionally, expert witnesses can provide important expertise 
to aid the trier of fact in complex technology cases, as the Second Circuit 
recognized in Altai.333
To overcome the misleading metaphor of software as a “literary 
work,” courts should follow Altai’s lead in acknowledging that the 
essentially utilitarian nature of software means that programs have only
                                                                                                                     
327. Samuelson et al., supra note 13.
328. See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 14, at 1151–53.
329. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1284–85.
330. Altai’s failure to direct filtering out processes and methods from the scope of copyright 
was likely due to the influence of the Nimmer treatise that, until recently, had an unduly narrow 
interpretation of § 102(b). Id. at 1235–37.
331. The Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, for instance, hosts an annual program for 
federal judges on intellectual property and technology law topics. See Berkeley Center for Law & 
Technology, RES. UC BERKELEY, http://vcresearch.berkeley.edu/research-unit/berkeley-center-
law-and-technology [https://perma.cc/6SME-WLGV] (describing its annual judicial training 
sessions).
332. See, e.g., MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATENT PILOT PORGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT 
v (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Patent%20Pilot%20Program%20Five-
Year%20Report%20(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/6897-U6E5].
333. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712–13 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting 
that “the highly complicated and technical subject matter at the heart of these claims” make them 
“somewhat impenetrable by lay observers” so expert testimony may aid resolution of the 
infringement issue). The Ninth Circuit has taken a more restrictive approach to expert testimony 
in software cases. See Antonick v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 841 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth 
Circuit was correct in ruling against Antonick because he claimed that Electronic Arts had copied 
his source code but produced no evidence of this. See id. at 1069. But the court’s unwillingness 
to allow expert testimony in software cases except on the issue of probative similarities is 
questionable. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors in Support of 
Petitioner at 2, Antonick, 841 F.3d 1062 (No. 17-168).
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a narrow scope of copyright protection.334 Courts should also engage in 
rigorous filtering out of unprotectable elements before the comparison 
stage of infringement analysis, as Altai and its progeny direct.335
Altai offered important guidance about how to distinguish program 
expression and program function. By characterizing efficient designs as 
lying outside of copyright bounds under the merger doctrine and 
identifying several types of external factors that may constrain 
programmer design choices,336 Altai offered useful tools with which to 
assess nonliteral infringement claims and filter out functional elements. 
This is similar to the process of claim construction that courts routinely 
employ in patent cases.337 Just as those claiming trade dress protections 
for product configurations must prove their designs are nonfunctional,338
plaintiffs asserting nonliteral infringement claims should have to prove 
that nonliteral elements of software alleged to infringe are neither 
efficient nor scènes à faire, nor otherwise constrained by external 
factors.339 The existence of alternative ways to accomplish the function 
should not be dispositive of non-functionality.340
Unfortunately, Altai did not offer any guidance about how to filter out 
§ 102(b) methods in software copyright cases. This is surprising given 
the explicit statement in the legislative history that § 102(b) 
method/process exclusions should ensure that software copyrights would 
not be construed too broadly.341 Numerous cases have, however, adapted 
                                                                                                                     
334. Altai, 982 F.2d at 704.
335. Id. at 707.
336. Id. at 707–08.
337. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 
2202–03 (2016) (recommending that courts determine the scope of litigated IP rights in a manner 
akin to claim construction of patents).
338. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). It is currently 
unclear whether the plaintiff or defendant bears a burden of proof about non-functionality or 
whether particular elements of software are protectable expression or unprotectable methods. 
Some courts have put the burden of proof about unprotectables on defendants. See, e.g., Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 (11th Cir. 1996). Especially when dealing with a highly 
functional work such as software, plaintiffs should have to prove what aspects of their programs 
are expressive enough to qualify for copyright protection. After all, plaintiffs bear the burden of 
proof that defendants improperly appropriated original expression from their works. See, e.g., 3 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 276, § 9.3.2.2, at 9:46 (“The abstraction-filtration-comparison test places 
a special burden on the copyright owner to highlight the original and expressive elements that it 
claims are infringed.”).
339. See, e.g., Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of Ind., L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 
1040–41 (9th Cir. 2015); Altai, 982 F.2d at 709–10. 
340. As Weinreb once observed, “if the rubric [of other possible design choices] is so used, 
copyright effectively absorbs the whole of patent.” Weinreb, supra note 14, at 1170. The CAFC 
in Oracle concluded that the Java API was original expression because Sun/Oracle made choices 
among alternatives. Oracle Am., v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
341. See supra notes 52, 246 and accompanying text.
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the AFC test to filter out § 102(b) methods in software copyright cases.342
Commentators have also offered guidance about how to discern § 102(b) 
method exclusions by focusing on particular aspects of programs and 
using pertinent computer science terminology instead of vague terms 
such as “SSO.”343
Among the aspects of programs that courts have excluded as 
unprotectable § 102(b) methods are the functional behavior of 
programs,344 algorithms,345 data structures,346 command structures,347
computer languages,348 methods of calculation,349 computational 
processes,350 interfaces necessary to interoperability,351 and formulae.352
The Copyright Office Compendium has identified numerous aspects of 
programs that it regards as unprotectable by copyright, including 
algorithms, languages, interfaces, formulae, logic, system design, and 
formats.353
Since Altai, courts have generally required software plaintiffs to 
particularize the elements of computer programs on which they base their 
nonliteral infringement claims.354 Courts also typically engage in 
                                                                                                                     
342. See, e.g., Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1541 n.21; Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 
F.3d 823, 842–43 (10th Cir. 1993) (excluding algorithms from software copyright scope). 
Patented elements should also be filtered out. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 32.
343. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton & Ted Sabety, Computer Science Concepts in Copyright 
Cases: The Path to a Coherent Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239, 240 (1997); see also Randall 
Davis, The Nature of Software and Its Consequences for Establishing and Evaluating Similarity,
5 SOFTWARE L.J. 299, 301–09 (1992) (computer scientist’s explanation of program components).
344. See, e.g., O.P. Sols., Inc. v. Intellectual Prop. Network Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 7952 (LAP), 
1999 WL 47191, at *16–19 (S.D.N.Y.  Feb. 2, 1999).
345. See, e.g., Torah Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
346. See, e.g., Baystate Techs., Inc. v. Bentley Sys., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1079, 1088–89 (D. 
Mass. 1996); see also Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 343, at 259–64 (observing that a 
programmer’s choice of algorithms may constrain data structure choices).
347. See, e.g., MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g. Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1556–57 (11th Cir. 
1996); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). But see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 
1356–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Some cases deny similar copyright claims on other grounds. See, e.g.,
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373–76 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding Mitel’s command 
codes were unprotectable on scènes à faire and unoriginality grounds).
348. See, e.g., SAS Inst. Inc., v. World Programming Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 3d 755, 776 (E.D.N.C. 
2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 874 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2017).
349. See, e.g., Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1042, 1052 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
350. See, e.g., Wyatt Tech. Corp. v. Malvern Instruments, Inc., No. CV 07-08298 DDP 
(manX), 2009 WL 2365647, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2009).
351. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–23 (9th Cir. 1992).
352. See, e.g., Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 820 (W.D. Wisc. 2010).
353. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 44, § 721.7.
354. See MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g. Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(limiting the infringement analysis to eighteen specific similarities).
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element-by-element analysis to determine whether the nonliteral 
elements allegedly infringed are copyright-protectable or 
unprotectable.355 Plaintiffs’ failure to particularize elements alleged to be 
infringed and trial courts’ failure to filter out unprotectables have resulted 
in some summary judgments for defendants and some reversals of 
plaintiff victories.356
Plaintiffs in software copyright cases may prefer to employ vague 
terms such as SSO to describe the nonliteral elements alleged to infringe 
because such terms obscure, rather than illuminate, which program 
structures are expressive enough to be copyright-protectable and which 
are not.357 Courts should consequently be much more skeptical about 
SSO claims than they have been to date. All procedures, processes, 
systems and methods of operation are, by their nature, parts of program 
SSO. Section 102(b) directs that these elements be excluded from the 
scope of copyright.358 Moreover, as Altai pointed out, the term SSO 
“demonstrate[s] a flawed understanding of a computer program’s method 
of operation” and rests on a “somewhat outdated appreciation of
computer science.”359 Plaintiffs should be required to prove the 
expressiveness of structural elements they allege as the basis of nonliteral 
infringement claims. Courts should also recognize the benefits of 
standardization in software copyright nonliteral infringement cases.360
Defenses that rely on issued patents on program methods/systems 
should be treated as evidence that these elements are uncopyrightable 
under § 102(b).361 Although fewer software-related patents may have 
been issued since Alice, hundreds of thousands of software patents still 
                                                                                                                     
355. See, e.g., id.
356. See Automated Sols. Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., 756 F.3d 504, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to specify elements alleged to infringe); see 
also Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1207–08 (10th Cir. 2014) (vacating a 
ruling for plaintiff due to failure to filter out unprotectable elements).
357. See, e.g., Chisum et al., supra note 18, at 20–21.
358. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
359. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 343 (stating that SSO does not “accurately reflect[] computer 
science reality”).
360. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J.
35, 42–43, 47, 49 (1989); Weinreb, supra note 14, at 1204 (discussing standardization in relation 
to Borland).
361. See supra Section III.C; see also NIMMER & NIMMER 2018, supra note 17,
§ 2A.07[D][4][c][iii] (“[A] court adjudicating a case presenting the utility patent/copyright 
overlap must calibrate copyright protection with reference to Section 102(b). . . . [I]f the court 
concludes that plaintiff can vault the Section 102(b) hurdle, then the existence of patent protection 
should cause the court to re-evaluate its conclusion about Section 102(b).”).
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exist.362 Because Alice may undermine the enforceability of such patents,
developers may claim them as program SSO instead. Copyright law 
should not be used as a substitute or gap-filler for programmers’ failure 
to get or to seek a patent for functional design elements of programs or 
for patents of dubious validity.363
Courts should further be skeptical about compilation claims in 
software cases.364 The “industrial compilation[s] of applied know-how” 
in programs should generally be ineligible for copyright protection.365
Microsoft rightly held that the selection and arrangement of unprotectable 
elements of the Apple GUI were too functional to be copyright-
protectable.366 Only when software elements have been selected and 
arranged in an expressive way should copyright protection be available 
to a compilation of them.367 The existence of alternative ways to organize 
the elements may be a factor in assessing whether the creativity required 
                                                                                                                     
362. See Raymond Millien, Alice Who? Over Half the U.S. Utility Patents Issued Annually 
are Software Related!, IPWATCHDOG (May 21, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/21/
alice-over-half-u-s-utility-patents-issued-annually-software/id=83367/ [https://perma.cc/A743-
QFBR].
363. If a plaintiff received a patent on a software design (e.g., a data structure) and then 
claimed copyright in it, relying on the overlap dicta in Oracle, a court should decide that the 
plaintiff’s election of patent protection precludes copyright in it. See, e.g., Korzybski v. 
Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1929) (finding that a patent on an 
anthropometer design precluded a claim of copyright infringement); see also Michael J. Kline, 
Requiring an Election of Protection for Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Programs, 6 
COMPUTER L.J. 607, 609 (1986) (suggesting that a programmer should be required to choose either 
patent protection or copyright protection when a program qualifies for both).
364. Cisco v. Arista illustrates the misuse of compilation theory. Cisco claimed that 508
command-line interface terms Arista used from as many as twenty-six Cisco programs was a 
compilation whose copyright Arista infringed. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Arista Networks, Inc., No. 14-
cv-05344-BLF, 2016 WL 4440239, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016). This so-called compilation 
apparently didn’t exist before Cisco filed suit. Id. at *3–4. At trial, Arista’s scènes à faire defense 
succeeded. Order Denying Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law & Motion for a New Trial, 
Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Arista Networks, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-05344-BLF, 2016 WL 4440239 (N.D. 
Cal. May 10, 2017); see also eScholar LLC v. Otis Educ. Sys. Inc., 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 
1898 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (relying on compilation theory to extend protection to program methods).
365. Samuelson et al., supra note 13, at 2355.
366. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see 
supra note 183 and accompanying text; see also MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g. Co., 89
F.3d 1548, 1558–59 (11th Cir. 1996) (adopting the “bodily appropriation of expression” or 
“virtual identicality” standard used in Microsoft). Many non-software compilations have been 
denied copyright protection because they were too functional to be copyrightable. See Pamela 
Samuelson, Functional Compilations, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 323–54 (2016) (identifying several 
types of functional compilations held unprotectable by copyright law).
367. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of compilation); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (discussing the quantum of originality required for 
compilations to qualify for copyright).
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to select and arrange the elements is of the sort that copyright law was 
intended to protect, but it should not be dispositive.
Nonliteral infringement software copyright cases could be much 
easier if courts decided that copyright protection extends only to program 
code and expressive screen displays, as Rand Jaslow argued many years 
ago in Whelan.368 However, the proposition that software copyrights can 
be nonliterally infringed is now so well established that it seems unlikely 
courts will shift in that direction, however persuasive the arguments 
supporting that approach may be.369
Courts can and should be very rigorous in their infringement analyses 
in software copyright cases so that plaintiffs cannot get patent-like 
protection for functional structures of programs or protection for other 
unprotectable elements. Competition and ongoing innovation policy, as 
well as the progress of knowledge, will be fostered if programmers can 
draw upon uncopyrightable components of programs in constructing new 
software.370
CONCLUSION
Congress was warned as early as 1967 that copyright protection for 
computer programs might result in conferring patent-like protection to
functional aspects of programs, such as the methods and processes they 
embody. Congress did the right thing in responding to this concern by 
adding § 102(b) to the 1976 Act hoping to ensure that “in no case” would 
copyright protection extend to any “procedure, process, system, [or] 
method of operation” of programs.371 The House and Senate reports 
plainly reflect the intention that these exclusions would stop program 
copyrights from being construed too broadly.
The § 102(b) functionality exclusions were ignored in Whelan and its 
progeny in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, which led to a storm of criticism 
from IP lawyers and academics, as well as to some alarm by computing 
professionals. Responding to these concerns, Congress once again did the 
right thing in the late 1980s and early 1990s by holding hearings and 
                                                                                                                     
368. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 
1986).
369. See Karjala, Relative Roles, supra note 17, at 52–53; see also Weinreb, supra note 14,
at 1249–50 (arguing against nonliteral infringement); Goldstein, supra note 17, at 1125 (stating 
copyright provides “very thin” protection to programs).
370. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 (1989) 
(“Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements . . . provide the baseline of free 
competition upon which the patent system’s incentive to creative effort depends. A . . . law that 
substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which 
has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the 
ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.”).
371. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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commissioning reports to investigate the state of software copyright and 
patent protection for programs and what Congress might do about it.
The turning point away from Whelan-like overprotection was the 
Second Circuit’s Altai decision, which recognized the highly utilitarian 
nature of programs and directed courts to engage in rigorous filtration to 
prevent copyright protection from extending to program functionality. As 
a result of this decision and others that followed its lead, the risks of harm 
to competition and innovation in the software industry from overbroad 
copyright protections subsided.
For more than twenty years, courts following Altai’s lead were 
mindful that copyright and patent have different roles to play in 
protecting software, and the § 102(b) exclusions of methods and 
processes, the merger doctrine, and the explanation/use distinction have 
served as useful tools with which to maintain proper boundaries between 
these two forms of exclusive rights. As long as courts have kept in mind 
the highly utilitarian nature of software and recognized that protecting 
functionality is the appropriate role of patents, they have generally done 
a good job steering a course through the Scylla of underprotection and 
the Charybdis of overprotection. When courts interpret software 
copyright in the shadow of patents, they are less likely to exceed the 
boundaries that Congress intended to establish by enacting § 102(b).
By misconstruing Mazer, Altai, and § 102(b), the Oracle decision has 
reignited concerns about copyright law being construed to provide patent-
like protections to programs. The decision has already precipitated a new 
round of software copyright cases seeking Whelan-like protection of 
nonliteral elements as SSO. The CAFC’s endorsement of copyright and 
patent overlaps is inconsistent with its own and many other precedents,
as well as with longstanding limiting principles of copyright law. How 
tempting it is now for software developers to claim SSO copyright 
protection for unpatented functionality. And how tempting to add a patent 
claim to a software copyright complaint to ensure that any appeal will go 
to the CAFC where they can rely on its Oracle precedent, thereby 
avoiding the regional circuits that would have followed the Altai-plus 
rigorous filtration precedents. Congress is too busy with other matters to 
save the day, and not even the Second or Ninth Circuits can fix the 
problem that the Oracle decision has created. If the Supreme Court 
decides to hear Google’s appeal of the CAFC’s Oracle decision, courts 
may get the guidance they need to construe the scope of copyright 
protection for software in the manner Congress intended back in the 
1980s.
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